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`... the future of security prices is never predictable' 
Benjamin Graham, 2003, p. 24 
ABSTRACT 
This study intends to investigate the momentum effect, which states that shares 
which performed the best (worst) over the previous three to twelve months continue 
to perform well (poorly) over the subsequent three to twelve months. Evidence 
suggests that a strategy that buys previous winner shares and sells short past loser 
stocks can generate abnormal profitability of about 1 per cent per month (Jegadeesh 
and Titman, 1993). Although momentum payoffs tend to persist when share returns 
in international markets are employed (e. g. `, Griffin et al., 2003, Rouwenhorst, 
1998), a significant number of studies have debated the potential explanation of the 
momentum effect without reaching a consensus. 
Using data from the London Stock Exchange from January 1975 to October 2001, 
this thesis investigates some factors that influence the magnitude of continuation 
gains that have not been previously identified. I examine the relationship between 
momentum profitability and the stock market trading mechanism and is motivated 
by recent changes to the trading systems that have taken place on the London Stock 
Exchange. Since 1975 the London stock market has employed three different 
trading systems: a floor based system, a computerised dealer system called SEAQ 
and the automated auction system SETS. I find that after the introduction of the 
computerised dealer system SEAQ momentum profits are higher than when the 
floor based system operated. I also document that companies trading on the SETS 
auction system display greater momentum profitability than shares trading on 
SEAQ. Results are robust to the use of different samples and alternative risk 
adjustments. 
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I investigate the role of volatility in influencing momentum profits. Shares with 
high volatility display wide spread out returns and therefore, potential higher 
magnitude momentum profitability. Given that shares displayed higher volatility 
traded on the post-Big Bang period (Tonks and Webb, 1991) and on the SETS 
system (Chelley-Steeley, 2003), I examine whether the different levels of 
momentum profitability achieved in alternative stock market structures arises from 
volatility. I find that momentum profits are strongly influenced by volatility, but the 
finding that the organisation of a stock market influences the momentum profits 
holds even after considering differences in volatility. 
I examine whether the magnitude of momentum profitability varies following bull 
and bear markets. Momentum profits stem from the winner shares in bull markets 
and from the loser stocks in bear markets. I report that momentum profits are 
stronger following bear markets, showing a sign of mean reversion in the UK stock 
market. 
Overall, this study contradicts the model of Hong and Stein (1999) that the 
momentum effect arises from the gradual expansion of information among investors 
and the model of Daniel et al. (1998) that the momentum effect stems from the 
investors' overconfidence that increases following the arrival of confirming news. 
This study also indicates that a significant portion of momentum profits stem from 
the magnitude of volatility. 
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Chapter 1 
'I Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
The theory of market efficiency constitutes one of the most interesting fields in 
finance. It states that share prices reflect all available information and investors 
cannot develop trading rules that earn systematic profits above transaction cost. 
Until the-mid 1970s, most evidence appeared to support the concept of market 
efficiency. However, from this point onwards, numerous papers have debated the 
validity of stock market efficiency. On the one hand, more and more findings have 
demonstrated that investors can achieve returns those expected given the level of 
risk involved. On the other hand, supporters of market efficiency have argued that 
alternative investment strategies are not convincing. 
The momentum effect is one of several stock market anomalies that have 
contradicted market efficiency. In the momentum effect, shares that have achieved 
the highest (lowest) performance over the previous three to twelve months continue 
to perform well (disappointingly) over the following three to twelve months 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Stated differently, momentum strategies suggest that 
investors should buy stocks with the best performances over the past medium period 
and sell short securities with the worst returns over the prior medium-term horizon. 
The motivation to investigate the momentum effect stems from the significance of 
the findings in the field. Following momentum strategies, traders seem able to 
generate significant profits. Academic studies (e. g., Rouwenhorst, 1998; Liu et al., 
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1999) report that the market-adjusted profitability of these strategies is 
approximately 1 per cent per month. This abnormal performance persists in the 
majority of out-of-sample tests, in different data sets and in different time periods. 
Momentum profits continued in the 1990s US market at the same magnitude as in 
previous periods (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993,2001b). Momentum profits are 
present in 12 developed European markets (Rouwenhorst, 1998), in 29 out of 37 
international markets (Griffin et al., 2003), in 17 out of 20 emerging stock 
exchanges (Rouwenhorst, 1999) and in Asian markets with the exception of Japan 
and Korea (Chui et al., 2000). Consistent with Griffin et al. (2003), the average 
monthly momentum profits are 1.63 per cent in Africa, 0.78 per cent in America 
(excluding the US market), 0.32 per cent in Asia, 0.77 per cent in Europe and 0.49 
per cent over the whole world. 
Momentum strategies also appear to work in practical investment settings, since 
professional practitioners tend to employ momentum strategies for selecting stocks. 
Grinblatt et äl. (1995) examine 274 mutual funds and report that 77 per cent of the 
managers use the momentum investment tool. Brozynski et al. (2003), using a 
survey to collect data, state that the momentum strategy is a very widely used 
investing tool among fund managers in Germany. Riley (1999) reports that the 
winner fund manager in Standard and Poor's Micropal award in 1999 stated that he 
frequently followed continuation investment strategies. 
Extending the investigation beyond share returns, the momentum effect tends to 
persist even using industries and international stock index returns. Countries and 
industries that demonstrate the best (lowest) performance over the previous three to 
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twelve months remain the winner (loser) countries and industries over the 
subsequent three to twelve months. For example, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) 
report that the industry returns exhibit continuation effects, and Chan et al. (2000), 
employing 23 international markets, as well as Bhojraj and Swaminathan (2001), 
using 38 international countries and 16 developed countries, find that the 
international stock index returns demonstrate that momentum strategies can be 
profitable. 
Explanations of the momentum effect seem to vary from study to study, since 
alternative explanations are not supported by different data sets and methodologies. 
For example, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) report that an industry factor can 
explain the momentum profits. However, Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), 
excluding Nasdaq stocks from Moskowitz's and Grinblatt's sample and examining 
an alternative breakdown for defining winners and losers, argue that in these 
circumstances, the industry factor cannot explain the continuation profitability. The 
opposite findings that emerge using different data sets indicate the requirement for 
further empirical investigation into the rationale behind this anomaly. Over the last 
few years, an increasing number of papers attempt to explain the momentum effect 
including papers from the behavioural finance literature (e. g., Barberis et al., 1998). 
Momentum profitability also appears to be more robust than other stock market 
anomalies. The three-factor model that controls for market returns, firm size and 
book-to-market values can explain a large number of anomalies such as the long- 
term overreaction effect, but not the momentum effect (Fama and French, 1996). 
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Fama (1998) doubts the robustness of the behavioural anomalies, but he accepts that 
the momentum anomaly remains an 'open puzzle'. 
In addition, using UK data, very little attention has been focused on the momentum 
effect. Liu et al. (1999) is the first investigation, which employs UK returns, and 
examines the continuation effect. They find that the momentum effect is present for 
their sample of firms; abnormal profits persist after controlling for risk defined by 
the CAPM and the three-factor model. They examine further the momentum profits 
generated in alternative size, book-to-market and cash earnings to price sub-sample 
portfolios. Other UK studies investigate the momentum hypothesis are those by Hon 
and Tonks (2003) and Hou et al. (2003). Definitely, more investigation in the field 
could and should be undertaken. 
These findings in favour of the momentum anomaly indicate a requirement for 
further investigation in the field. 
15 
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1.2 OBJECTIVES AND FINDINGS 
The focus of this thesis is to investigate factors that influence the magnitude of 
continuation profits. Researchers have proposed alternative factors that are 
associated with the momentum effect, but findings are not unanimously supported 
by different data sets" and methodologies. This study intends to examine some 
factors that have not been previously identified. 
I examine the relationship between momentum profitability and the stock market 
trading mechanism and is motivated by recent changes to the trading systems that 
have taken place on the London Stock Exchange. Since 1975 the London stock 
market has employed three different trading systems: a floor based system, a 
computerised dealer system called SEAQ and the automated auction system SETS. 
The level of transparency and operational efficiency that each system provides 
exerts an important influence on the diffusion of information. Since behavioural 
finance argues that the diffusion rate of information exerts a major influence over 
momentum we examine whether the magnitude of momentum profits are related to 
the type of stock market trading system. I find that after the introduction of the 
computerised dealer system SEAQ momentum profits are higher than when the 
floor based system operated. I also find that companies trading on the SETS 
auction system display greater momentum profitability than shares trading on 
SEAQ. Results are robust to the use of different samples and alternative risk 
adjustments. 
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I investigate the role of volatility in influencing momentum profits. Shares with 
high volatility display wide spread out returns and therefore, potential higher 
magnitude momentum profitability. Given that shares displayed higher volatility 
traded on the post-Big Bang period (Tonks and Webb, 1991) and on the SETS 
system (Chelley-Steeley, 2003), I examine whether the different levels of 
momentum profitability achieved in alternative stock market structures arises from 
volatility. I find that momentum profits are strongly influenced by volatility, but the 
finding that the organisation of a stock market influences the momentum profits 
holds even after considering differences in volatility. 
I examine whether the magnitude of momentum profitability varies following bull 
and bear markets. Momentum profits stem from the winner shares in bull markets 
and from the loser stocks in bear markets. But, are momentum profits stronger 
following bull or bear markets? Recent studies have investigated the field without 
however reaching a consensus, since results from different data sets often conflict. 
Griffin et al. (2003) use data from international markets and report that momentum 
profits are stronger following bear markets and Rey and Schmid, (2003) using data 
from the Swiss Market, state that momentum profits are stronger in a sub-period 
where a bear market is present. However, Cooper et al. (2004) who employ US data 
find that momentum profits are stronger following bull markets. This study uses UK 
data and report that momentum profits are stronger following bear markets that 
perhaps shows a sign of mean reversion in the UK stock market. 
This study undertakes an out-of-sample test of whether a strategy that combines 
long-term overreaction and momentum effects can generate significant abnormal 
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profits. The overreaction anomaly utilises long-horizon returns and, proposes a 
strategy that buys past losers and sells short prior winners. The momentum effect 
focuses on medium-horizon returns and suggests a strategy that buys prior winners 
and sells short past losers. The combination strategy buys past losers over the long- 
period and past winners over the medium-horizon. I report that the hybrid strategy 
provides significant abnormal profits at 1.29 per cent per month. This profitability is 
significantly larger than that gained by the counterpart reversal strategy, but only a 
little higher than that found by the momentum strategy. The hybrid strategy tends to 
outperform significantly both counterpart methods during strong bull markets. 
This study reports that the continuation effect is associated with factors of which 
many have not been previously identified using any data set. This is important 
information for investors. Traders can achieve superior momentum returns 
following the conventional momentum strategy on shares with high volatility, on 
shares traded on an automated and auctions mechanisms and selecting to follow the 
momentum strategy in periods when the market return over the past six months was 
poor. This study also provides significant information for academics in the field. A 
significant portion of momentum profitability stems from the magnitude of 
volatility. When market is highly volatile, share prices tend to display wide out 
returns and therefore, high magnitude of momentum profitability is achieved. 
Nevertheless when investors invest in high volatility shares, they should be awarded 
with stronger returns for the risk they accept. This study contradicts the concept of 
Hong and Stein (1999) that the momentum effect arises from the gradual expansion 
of information among investors and contradicts the model of Daniel et al. (1998) 
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that the momentum effect stems from the investors' overconfidence that increases 
following the arrival of confirming news. 
1.3 ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY 
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Chapter 2A brief review of the Efficient Market Hypothesis debate 
Chapter 2 
A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
DEBATE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the momentum effect within the context of 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). The intention is to focus on information 
required to understand the subsequent empirical chapters and not to present a 
thorough literature review on the whole field'. This chapter approaches the question 
of whether investors can systematically achieve higher risk-adjusted returns than the 
market by following an investment strategy. This chapter concludes that the debate 
on the validity of stock market efficiency is far from over. We are a long way from 
suggesting an investment strategy that can provide certain abnormal profits in the 
future. The publication of successful investment strategies, which use past data 
inhibits those strategies from generating profitability in the future. If investors 
employ these strategies, they may cause the weakening of their capability to provide 
profitability. 
This chapter is structured as follows: section 2.2 outlines the concept of market 
efficiency, section 2.3 reviews empirical findings on this topic, section 2.4 surveys 
results in support of the EMH, and the last section summarises the chapter. 
1 Fama (1970,1991), Malkiel (2003) and Beechey et al. (2000) provide successful review papers on 
stock market efficiency. 
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2.2 THE CONCEPT OF THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
The theory of market efficiency constitutes one of the most interesting fields in 
finance. There are alternative definitions of an efficient market. The most dogmatic 
version of the EMH states that security prices fully reflect all available information. 
This version of the hypothesis suggests that a large number of rational investors 
exist in the market, and assumes that traders do not face any information and 
transaction costs. Owing to these strong assumptions, this version of the EMH is 
`surely false' (Fama, 1991, pp. 1575). 
Apart from the extreme definition of market efficiency, there is the less stringent 
version, which maintains that market efficiency holds where investors cannot follow 
trading rules that display systematic profits above the transaction cost and the risk 
premium (Jensen, 1978). Even if there were investment strategies that could achieve 
abnormal profitability, other investors would exploit any inefficiency rapidly and 
their arbitrage transactions would re-establish efficiency quickly. 
Fama (1970) classifies the EMH into three forms according to the adjustment of 
share prices to different information. In the weak form, share prices reflect all the 
information in historical prices. Future equity prices cannot be predicted from past 
prices and hence, technical analysis cannot offer excess profitability. In the semi- 
strong form, security prices reflect not only information contained in historical 
prices but also all publicly available information. This form of efficiency implies 
that traders cannot achieve abnormal returns when they analyse information that is 
announced publicly, such as firms' earnings and dividend changes. Fundamental 
analysis cannot provide abnormal performance because prices adjust rapidly to 
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newly published information and investors cannot exploit the inefficiency. In the 
strong form, prices reflect all information including private information. Even 
investors with inside information cannot benefit from their privileged news to earn 
abnormal returns. 
In a more recent paper, Fama (1991) divides market efficiency into three slightly 
different concepts. The empirical findings that have been published in the post-1970 
period allow re-definition of the previous classification. The return predictability 
group replaces the weak form. The new category is more generally applicable than 
the weak form as it additionally includes other forecasting variable findings. 
Beyond the use of past returns to predict future returns, it includes the capability of 
other factors, such as the market capitalisation of shares and the P/E ratio, to predict 
future returns. The event studies group replaces the semi-strong form and the 
private information category replaces the strong form. The difference between the 
old and the new group is the change of titles rather than the coverage of tests. Fama 
(1991) employed the new terminology because it was more descriptive. 
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2.3 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
In this section, some of the most significant results opposed to the market efficiency 
in the post-1970 period are presented. 
2.3.1 Winner-Loser Effect 
The winner-loser hypothesis is perhaps one of the most significant recent stock 
market anomalies. Numerous studies have attempted to explain the effect, but 
academics cannot reach a consensus about what generates it. The winner-loser 
effect concerns three anomalies over different time horizons. 
With the momentum anomaly (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), shares that achieve the 
best (lowest) performance over the previous three to twelve months continue to 
display higher (lower) than average returns over the subsequent three to twelve 
months. In an attempt to explain the continuation hypothesis, Moskowitz and 
Grinblatt (1999) argue that an industry factor can explain the abnormal returns. 
When they subtract an industry return from the corresponding stock return, the 
momentum strategy cannot demonstrate significant profitability. Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2001) report that the business cycles of an economy influence the 
continuation payoffs, the difference between the momentum profitability in 
expansionary and recessionary periods being 1.25 per cent per month. Lee and 
Swaminathan (2000) suggest that portfolios formed on the basis of different 
amounts of trading volume display different momentum profits. A high minus low 
trading volume portfolio achieves profitability of 0.91 per cent per month. 
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With the long-term overreaction hypothesis (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985), shares that 
perform well (badly) over the past three to five years tend to perform poorly (well) 
over the following three to five years. The past losers outperform the prior winners 
by approximately 25 to 32 per cent over a subsequent three to five years 
respectively. Zarowin (1990) associates the profitability of this anomaly with firm 
size. When past winners and losers are matched by size, the reversal of long-term 
profitability disappears. 
With the short-term overreaction effect (e. g., Jegadeesh, 1990), securities that 
realise the best (worst) returns over the past one week to one month tend to obtain 
disappointing (high) returns over the subsequent one week to one month. A strategy 
that buys past losers and sells short prior winners provides returns of around 1.99 
per cent per month. Kaul and Nimalendran (1990) associate the short-run 
overreaction anomaly with microstructure biases. They collect bid-to-bid data and 
demonstrate that a continuation in prices, rather than a reversal effect, is observed. 
Other researchers link short-term predictability with trading volume (e. g., Hameed 
and Ting, 2000) and show that there is a positive relationship between trading 
volume and short-term overreaction profitability. 
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2.3.2 Size Effect 
The size effect states that small capitalisation shares achieve higher returns than 
large capitalisation securities. Banz (1981) examines the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) over the 1931-1975 period, and demonstrates that the fifty smallest 
companies outperformed the fifty largest stocks by an average of 1 per cent per 
month. Reinganum (1981,1982) reports differences in the risk-adjusted return of 
small and large firms to be as high as 30 per cent per year. 
The profitability related to this size anomaly is also strong using non-US data. Small 
companies tend to generate significantly higher performances than large firms on 
the Belgium market (Hawanini et at., 1989), on the Japanese market (Hawanini, 
1991), on the Mexico stock market (Herrera and Lockwood, 1994) and on the 
Korean equity market (Cheung et al., 1994). Both Banz (1985), examining data 
from 1955 to 1983, and Dimson and Marsh (1984), analysing returns from 1977 to 
1983, find that small size stocks outperform their large size counterparts even using 
UK data. Banz finds that the compound annual return on the smallest portfolio 
exceeded that of the largest by 27 per cent while Dimson and Marsh report that that 
percentage is about 23 per cent. 
Profits due to the size anomaly tend to vary across the different months of the year. 
Keim (1983) and Roll (1983) report that around half of the excess profitability of 
small capitalisation stocks is exhibited in the first five trading days of January. 
Reinganum (1982) concurs with this finding, and shows that small firms outperform 
their large capitalisation counterparts by 3 per cent on the first trading day of 
January. 
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However, not all research supports the existence of the size effect. Dimson et al. 
(2001), employing UK data, argue that the size effect does not apply when recent 
data are analysed. They show that small shares display higher returns than their 
large equity counterpart between 1955 and 1988. However, over the 1989-2000 
period, large companies outperformed small shares by 4.3 per cent per annum. 
2.3.3 January Effect 
The January anomaly relates to the fact that shares demonstrate a significantly 
higher performance during the month of January. Rozeff and Kinney (1976) study 
NYSE shares over the 1904-1974 period and report that average stock returns for 
the month of January are 3.48 per cent, but only 0.42 per cent for the other months 
of the year. 
Academics have attempted to explain the effect without reaching a consensus on 
what induces the January anomaly. One of the best-known explanations of the 
January effect is that of Keim and Roll (1982), who rationalise the January effect by 
invoking the tax-loss-selling hypothesis. Before the start of the new tax year, 
investors sell securities that have declined in value over the previous year. This 
happens as traders attempt to minimise their tax liability. At the beginning of the 
new tax year, investors re-balance their portfolios. They buy shares and thus, 
generate the January effect. 
The tax-loss-selling hypothesis has itself attracted criticism because the January 
effect persists in countries where the start of the tax year is in months other than 
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January. For example, Australia operates a July/June tax year and, therefore, to be 
consistent with the tax-loss-selling hypothesis, shares should generate higher 
performances during the month of July. However, Brown et al. (1983) use 
Australian data to argue that shares still demonstrate high returns during January 
and not during July. 
Another explanation for the January seasonality, the gamesmanship hypothesis, is 
based on the trading behaviour of institutional investors (e. g., Haugen and 
Lakonishok, 1988; Lakonishok et al., 1991). Large traders are net buyers of risky 
shares at the beginning of the year. In January, institutional investors are much less 
concerned about including well-known securities in their portfolios and they do not 
attempt to outperform benchmarks. Throughout the year, portfolios are rebalanced. 
Professional traders sell less well-known and poorly performing shares from their 
portfolios and buy recognised stocks with satisfactory recent performance. 
Although most academics in the field have attempted to explain the effect, a number 
of findings demonstrate that the January effect does not remain robust using recent 
data. Mehdian and Perry (2002), investigating the January anomaly in US data, find 
that in the 1964-1987 period, the January effect is strong economically and 
statistically, but over the 1988-1998 period, the January anomaly does not provide 
statistically significant excess returns. Draper and Paudyal (1997) use UK data and 
find that after adjusting for transaction costs such as commission and bid-ask 
spread, the excess profits generated by the January effect disappear. 
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2.3.4 Weekend Effect 
Within seasonal anomalies, different days of the week seem to generate asymmetric 
performance. French (1980) reports that security performances tend to be negative 
on Mondays and positive during other days of the week. Board and Sutcliffe (1988), 
using the FTSE-All-Share Index over the 1962-1986 period, demonstrate that the 
weekend anomaly persists in the UK stock market. They show that an investor who 
sells short one million pounds' worth of shares on a Friday and buys back the 
equities on a Monday, would have achieved an average profit of three thousand 
pounds. However, Steeley (2001), using the FTSE100 index over the 1991-1998 
period, argues that the weekend effect does not exist in recent data. 
Rogalski (1984) attempts to link the weekend, the size and the January effects and 
concludes that all three anomalies are mutually, associated. Constructing ten 
portfolios based on the size of companies, Rogalski reports that the Monday effect 
is present only in the smallest capitalisation portfolio. In addition, he found that 
during January the weekend effect is not valid, since in that particular month, 
average Monday returns are positive. 
2.3.5 Value Effect 
The value anomaly demonstrates that investors can achieve abnormal profitability 
by analysing the fundamental value of firms. Low P/E shares appear to outperform 
high P/E firms. Basu (1977), using US data, documents that low P/E stocks 
outperformed high P/E stocks by more than 7 per cent per year over the 1957-1971 
period. Levis (1989) reports that the P/E effect is also present in the UK market 
employing data from April 1961 to March 1985. The average premium is 0.58 per 
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cent per month. Strong and Xu (1997) show that the existence of the P/E effect on 
the LSE is confirmed using recent data. 
In addition, high book-to-market companies seem to generate higher returns than 
low book-to-market equities. Chan et al. (1991) and Fama and French (1992) find 
that higher book-to-market ratios are associated with higher returns. Capaul et al. 
(1993) report that shares with high book-to-market generate monthly excess returns 
than shares with low book-to-market by 0.53 per cent using French stocks, 0.13 per 
cent employing data from Germany, 0.50 per cent using data from Japan and 0.23 
per cent employing UK data. 
2.3.6 Technical Analysis 
Technical rules are based on chart analysis and on the belief that price patterns in 
the past will be repeated in the future. Technical analysts use a vast range of trading 
rules. One of the simplest technical rules is based on moving averages, where a 
trader gets buy and sell signals depending upon short and long moving average 
values. A buy signal exists when the short-term moving average rises above the 
long-term moving average and a sell signal arises when the short-term moving 
average falls below the long-term moving average. Another popular rule is the filter 
strategy, where an investor gets a buy (sell) signal, when the share price rises (falls) 
by more than a given percentage from its previous low (high) point. 
Even though technical trading rules have been popular among mainly small 
investors, empirical findings have caused controversy regarding their predictive 
power. Results have varied when different data sets have been employed and 
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alternative technical trading rules have been investigated. Brock et al. (1992) is 
perhaps the most important study that supports technical analysis. Using the Dow 
Jones index from 1897 to 1986, they find that applying simple trading rules such as 
moving average rules can achieve significant returns. However, Dawson and 
Steeley (2003), employing UK data, argue that technical analysis cannot generate 
significant profitability. 
2.3.7 Value Line Ranking 
The Value Line Investment Survey publishes a weekly ranking of shares from one 
to five according to their expected performance in the subsequent six to twelve 
months. Group 1 has the best return prospects and group 5 the worst. Black (1973) 
reports that the first ranking group achieves an excess return over that offered by the 
market of 10 per cent per year, while the fifth category demonstrates losses of 10 
per cent per annum. Further studies (e. g., - Copeland and Mayers, 1982; Stickel, 
1985), which use different data sets, document that this anomaly is capable of 
achieving significant abnormal performance. 
2.3.8 Weather Effect 
The weather effect states that weather conditions influence stock market returns. 
Sunshine causes investors to be in a good mood and to be optimistic, while bad 
weather conditions cause traders to be pessimistic. Saunders (1993) reports that the 
NYSE index tends to display negative returns in cloudy weather conditions. 
Hirshleifer and Shumway (2001), employing data for 26 international markets, 
demonstrate that in most of the countries, sunshine is associated with positive share 
returns, but snow and rain do not influence traders' investment decisions. 
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2.3.9 Behavioural Finance 
Besides the criticism of stock market anomalies, the efficient market hypothesis has 
faced attack from the field of behavioural finance2. Supporters of behavioural 
finance attempt a reconciliation of market efficiency and human behaviour. The 
EMH is based on the hypothesis that investors are rational. Behavioural finance 
argues against this assumption, and states that investors are human beings who 
make systematic mistakes when they invest in shares. 
Many examples have demonstrated that investors do not behave rationally. For 
example, the majority (approximately 90 percent) of investors in the US, Japan and 
the UK do not utilise international diversification to diversify away fully the risk of 
their portfolios, but they tend to invest primarily in their domestic markets (French 
and Poterba, 1991). Traders tend to hold shares from companies that are in close 
geographical locations (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). Investors, especially men 
rather than women, tend to trade shares very frequently, generating low 
performances (Barber and Odean, 2000). Investors are sometimes too optimistic, 
while at other times are too pessimistic (Lee et al., 1991). 
Behavioural finance examines these irrationalities and their relevance to how share 
prices behave. 
2 Barberis and Thaler (2002) and Daniel et al. (2002) comprehensively review the subject. 
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2.4 CRITICISM TO ANOMALIES 
The previous section demonstrated that there exist investment strategies that can 
achieve excess returns. Nevertheless, the foregoing analysis of stock market 
anomalies highlighted only one side of the coin, since challenges to the EMH have 
themselves been subject to challenge. 
Researchers employ historical data when they undertake their studies. That there 
were anomalies in the past does not imply that they will necessarily remain in the 
future. As reported above, Dimson et al. (2001) and Steeley (2001) find that the size 
and the weekend effects respectively do not exist when recent data are used. When a 
strategy can achieve abnormal profits, numerous investors follow it, and gradually 
its ability to generate profitability disappears. Let's assume that traders attempt to 
exploit the January effect. They expect that shares will achieve higher returns in 
January rather than in the rest of the year, and, therefore, they would take their 
position in the market in December. The result would be the disappearance of the 
January effect, and the appearance of the December anomaly. In addition, academic 
analysis usually does not include costs such as transaction and information costs 
that traders face when they invest in shares. The inclusion of these costs can convert 
a profitable investment strategy into an unattractive trading rule. 
Another significant criticism of stock market anomalies is that the profitability of 
anomalies appears fragile (Fama, 1998). Profits reflect the use of different sub- 
periods and equity markets. Profitability varies when value-weighted portfolios and 
equal-weighted portfolios are constructed. The profits of alternative effects are 
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correlated (e. g., in the weekend effect; see Rogalski, 1984). Some anomalies do not 
present either economically or statistically significant returns (e. g., in the January 
effect; see Mehdian and Perry, 2002). Overall, Fama reports that it is not difficult to 
find strategies that enjoy excess returns when a specific period in an equity market 
is used. However, this does not imply that the market is inefficient. 
Another criticism of stock market anomalies is the joint-hypothesis problem (Fama, 
1991). Researchers examine the profits of an investment strategy after controlling 
for risk. The most common measurements of risk are given by the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; and Black, 1972) that controls for the 
market factor, and the three-factor, model (Fama and French, 1993) that controls for 
the market factor as well as for the size and the book-to-market of shares. The joint- 
hypothesis problem states that these asset-pricing models are only models, and not 
the EMH. When academics find that a strategy demonstrates significant profits after 
controlling for risk, this result does not imply that the market is inefficient. Instead, 
it indicates that the models that interpret risk may be inadequate and may not 
capture the return-risk relationship appropriately. 
Supporters of the EMH argue that stock market anomalies are reliable investing 
tools, if professional investors acknowledge them and use them to systematically 
outperform the market. However, empirical findings (e. g., Malkiel, 2003) reveal 
that apart from a few managers such as Peter Lynch, Warren Buffet and John Neff, 
professional investors cannot beat the market. During the 1990s, about three- 
quarters of institutional investors failed to achieve higher performances than the 
market. Institutional traders also appear not to be characterised by consistent 
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performances. The twenty mutual , 
funds that achieved the highest performances 
during the 1970s did not even manage to outperform the market in 1980s. 
Some stock market anomalies may appear due to data-snooping (Lo and 
MacKinlay, 1990). The majority of academics employ the same databases. The 
most common are the Datastream for various international stock markets, the 
London Share Price Database (LSPD) for the London Stock Exchange, and the 
Center for Research in Security Prices ' (CRSP) for US equity markets. These 
databases' coverage of shares is less than complete especially in their early years. 
For example, Datastream's coverage on the LSE is poor in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Nagel, 2000), LSPD provides only some of the UK listed companies in the pre- 
1975 period and is characterised by the thin trading problem (non-trading) which is 
especially apparent in small capitalisation companies. 
Another potential explanation for the appearance of stock market anomalies is data 
mining. Academics, with the assistance of modem technology, can easily and 
quickly examine the capability of alternative investment strategies to demonstrate 
abnormal performance. It is likely that a strategy will appear capable of generating 
significant returns when a specific sub-period and frequency of data are used. 
Academics tend to send for publication only the particular strategy that reports 
interesting findings. 
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2.5 CONCLUSION 
The debate over the validity of the EMH has generated numerous significant 
findings (Table 2.1). The supporters of stock market anomalies and behavioural 
finance have provided strong evidence against the hypothesis. However, they have 
only shed light on one side of the coin. Criticism of stock market anomalies has 
been substantial. 
It is hard to decide which side of the debate to support. On the one hand, it is certain 
that share prices are not always efficient according to fundamental values. The 
recent Internet bubble of the late 1990s is one example where equity prices deviated 
significantly from their values. On the other hand, it seems difficult to suggest a 
certain investment strategy that will reliably achieve abnormal returns in the future. 
Stock market anomalies show that with past data, there are alternative strategies 
that, on average, tend to generate returns in excess of the market. However, this 
does not imply that these strategies can provide significant performance in the 
future. Publication of these successful strategies causes the gradual weakening of 
their ability to generate profits. 
Overall, the debate over consistency of the market efficiency indicates the 
requirement for further investigation in the field. This study will investigate in depth 
the momentum effect. 
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Chapter 3 
A LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE WINNER-LOSER ANOMALY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents an in depth literature review of one specific investment 
strategy. Because of the close relationship between momentum and short- and long- 
term overreaction effects, the whole winner-loser anomaly will be considered. An 
understanding of the momentum hypothesis requires an understanding of the 
winner-loser anomaly. The conviction is that all three categories seem to reflect a 
similar phenomenon, since all three categories suggest that equity prices exhibit 
patterns over different time horizons. 
This chapter provides an innovative review of the winner-loser effect. Jegadeesh 
and Titman (2001 a) present a comprehensive survey of the momentum effect, and 
Forbes (1996) and Power and Lonie (1993) present extensive reviews for the short- 
and long-term overreaction hypotheses. This study presents an integrated study of 
all three, to highlight the significance of cross-references among the three effects. 
This chapter is structured as follows: sections 3.2,3.3 and 3.4 survey literature 
relating to the long-term overreaction, the short-term reversal and the momentum 
effects respectively; section 3.5 reviews studies that rationalise more than one part 
of the winner-loser effect; and section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
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3.2 LONG-TERM OVERREACTION EFFECT 
3.2.1 Evidence 
Research into the performance of past -winner and loser portfolios came to 
prominence with DeBondt's and Thaler's article in the Journal of Finance in 1985- 
which noted for the first time the overreaction hypothesis. DeBondt and Thaler rank 
securities based' on their returns over three to five years and divide them into 
portfolios. The 35 shares with the best performance are designated as the winner 
portfolio (W), while the 35 stocks with the worst performance constitute the loser 
category (L). They calculate the cumulative abnormal return of both groups 
(CARW, CARL) in the subsequent three to five years. They average the CAR s 
generated over the whole period in both categories (ACAR,, ACARL) and calculate 
the difference between them (ACARL - ACARW ). 
They conclude that, on average, shares with the worst (best) prior performances 
demonstrate positive (negative) returns over the subsequent three to five years 
(hence, ACARL - ACARW > 0). The past 35 losers outperformed the past 35 
winners by approximately 25 and 32 per cent over the following three and five years 
respectively. DeBondt and Thaler report that the profitability of this reversal 
strategy mainly stems from the loser rather than the winner portfolio. In the case of 
three-year periods, past loser shares gain 20 per cent more than the market, while 
their winner counterparts display losses that are 5 per cent lower than the markets. 
1 Dissanaike (1996) argues that the asymmetric reversal characteristic between winner and loser 
shares stems from the inappropriate measurement of returns. The test period return by itself is not a 
satisfactory measure of the strength of price reversal. Instead, the whole price movement from the 
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Using UK data, Power et al. (1991) and Campbell and Limmack (1997) concur with 
DeBondt and Thaler who employed US returns. Both UK studies identify that 
contrarian strategies can generate significant abnormal profitability. Power et al. use 
a list of the top 200 UK companies according to `Management Today', to define 
winners and losers. The top 30 shares in the list, with the best performance, 
constitute the winner portfolio, while the bottom 30 equities, with the worst returns, 
comprise the loser group. Campbell and Limmack, using data from the London 
Business School Risk Measurement Service, investigate the long-run overreaction 
profitability in a much larger number of winner and loser shares; over 4,000 equities 
were analysed. 
Extending the investigation beyond share returns, reversal profits appear strong 
using international stock index returns. Countries that demonstrate the best (lowest) 
performance over the previous three to five years become the loser (winner) 
countries over the subsequent three to five years. This finding persists for 16 
national markets (Richards, 1997) and using 38 international countries and 16 
developed markets (Bhojraj and Swaminathan, 2001). 
rank to the test period should be examined. Using UK data, Dissanaike documents that the loser and 
the winner portfolio experience approximately the same magnitude of abnormal profitability. 
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3.2.2 Alternative Explanations 
Because of the magnitude of abnormal profitability found by DeBondt and Thaler, 
and since they presented a challenge to the weak form of the EMH, academics have 
attempted to explain the long-term overreaction results. They have sought possible 
reasons for the apparent predictability in share returns without being able to reach a 
consensus on what induces the anomaly. 
One of the best- known studies that questions overreaction is Zarowin (1990). 
Zarowin links the abnormal profitability of long-term overreaction to the well- 
known size effect. When he matches winners with losers of the same size, the 
profits from long-term reversals disappear, except during the month of January. In 
addition, Zarowin finds that when losers have lower capitalisation than their winner 
counterparts, there is evidence of overreaction. Nonetheless, when losers are larger 
than winners, no evidence of overreaction is present in the return data. 
However, Zarowin's results do not hold when different data and different 
methodologies are used. Using UK data, Dissanaike (1997) documents that long- 
term overreaction profits persist for the FT500 Index that only utilises high 
capitalisation shares. Extending the investigation, Dissanaike (2002) analyses 
whether the long-term overreaction profits from a FT500 sample were due to the 
size effect. A portfolio of small capitalisation shares is compared with their large 
capitalisation counterparts, to determine whether any significant abnormal profits 
are caused by the size difference. Dissanaike discovers that although shares with 
small size generate higher contrarian profits than their large size counterparts, the 
long-term reversal effect displays higher profitability in all the individual test 
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periods. Dissanaike concludes that there is a link between the size effect and the 
long-term overreaction hypothesis, but that the size anomaly alone is not able to 
explain all the abnormal returns earned by the overreaction strategy. 
There is also some disagreement on whether risk can explain the long-term reversal 
effect. Fama and French (1996) find that the three-factor model (Fama and French, 
1993) can explain the long-term reversal profitability. 
The three-factor model is 
Re,, -Rf,, = ap +ßp(R, , i -Rf. f)+spSMBB +h 
HML, +ee,, (3.1) 
where RP,, - R1, is the excess return of a portfolio p, R,,,. t -Rf,, 
is the excess 
return on a market portfolio, SMB, (Small Minus Big) shows the portfolio that buys 
the three small size portfolios and sells short the three big size portfolios. HMLL 
(High Minus Low) shows the portfolio that buys the three high book-to-market 
portfolios and sells short the three low book-to-market portfolios. 
Fama and French examine the sensitivity of the slopes in the model and report that 
losers realise higher returns than their winners counterparts because losers are small 
capitalisation shares, while winners are securities in larger firms. The intercept of 
the model is almost zero; after employing for the three-factor model, the 
overreaction payoffs disappear. 
Chan (1988) and Ball and Kothari (1989) define risk as the beta from applying the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (see Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; and Black, 1972; 
RP., -Rf,, =ap+ /3p (R.,, - R1, ) + e1, t 
). They demonstrate that the long-term 
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overreaction effect can be explained by time-varying risk. Although the beta of 
losers is lower than the beta of winners in the rank period, by the end of the test 
period the beta of losers is higher than that of winners. Chan finds that the beta of 
losers increased by 0.21, while the beta of winners decreased by 0.22 over the test 
period. After controlling for changes in risk, only insignificant contrarian profits 
remain. For example, Ball and Kothari demonstrate that raw reversal profits are 
approximately 12-14 per cent per year, but after controlling for risk, contrarian 
profitability is less than 2 per cent per year. This suggests that reversal gains 
disappear after controlling for risk changes. 
However, Dissanaike (1997), using UK data, uses a similar methodology to that 
employed by Chan and Ball and Kothari, and argues that risk explanations cannot 
explain the long-term overreaction evidence. For example, Dissanaike finds that the 
beta of winners is higher than the beta of losers in the test period. After controlling 
for risk according to the CAPM, the strategy of buying past losers and selling short 
previous winners earns significant profits of 0.74 per cent per month. 
A further attack on the long-term overreaction effect argues that the anomaly arises 
from the inappropriate calculation of abnormal returns. Conrad and Kaul (1993) use 
the buy-and-hold approach where single-period returns are compounded, rather than 
using the typical cumulative abnormal return method, to examine the performance 
of the strategy. Abnormal profitability is measured as: 
HRP(k) = (1 + ER, )(1 + ER2)... (1 + ERK) -1 (3.2) 
where HRP is the holding return period, k shows the number of months over the 
test period and ER, shows the excess return of the portfolio in each test period. 
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Excluding January, the former approach yields long-term abnormal returns of -1.7 
per cent over a three-year period. Stated differently, using an alternative 
methodology to calculate abnormal profits, the reversal strategy generates losses 
rather than gains. 
Nonetheless, Conrad's and Kaul's critique has itself been subject to challenge. A 
large number of studies that have followed the buy-and-hold methodology have 
shown that the long-term profits from share price reversals remain economically and 
statistically significant (e. g., Dissanaike, 1997). 
In short, since DeBondt and Thaler (1985) documented their long-term overreaction 
results, studies have attempted to explain the anomaly. However, none of the 
alternative explanations appear able to subsume the effect. Neither size, risk nor 
methodological criticisms seem able to fully rationalise the anomaly. Further 
investigation is needed, to explain the long-term overreaction hypothesis. 
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3.3 SHORT-TERM OVERREACTION EFFECT 
3.3.1 Evidence 
A few years after DeBondt and Thaler's article was published in 1985, academics 
analysed patterns in returns over shorter time periods. Howe (1986) uses a similar 
methodology to DeBondt and Thaler, and reports that shares realised a large 
positive or negative performance in the past week experienced a reversal 
performance in the subsequent weeks. Dyl and Maxfield (1987) demonstrate that 
the three securities that achieve the highest (lowest) one-day performance generate 
1.8 (3.6) per cent lower (higher) return than the market index in the subsequent 10 
trading days. Lehmann (1990) finds that by ranking securities based on their 
previous week's performance, past winner and loser portfolios display a reversal 
pattern the following week. Prior winners (losers) generate losses (gains) of 
between -0.35 to -0.55 (from 0.86 to 1.24) per cent in the subsequent week. In 
addition, Jegadeesh (1990) investigates patterns in monthly prices and reports that 
with a one-month lag, the risk-adjusted return of the arbitrage portfolio is 1.99 per 
cent. 
Recent studies that use international data arrive at similar results to the pioneer 
studies. Bowman and Iverson (1998) and Antoniou et al. (2005) demonstrate 
evidence of short-run price reversal in share returns in the New Zealand and Athens 
Stock Exchanges respectively. 
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3.3.2 Alternative Explanations 
As in the case of the long-term overreaction effect, academics have attempted to 
rationalise these short-term contrarian profits without being able to reach a 
consensus. 
Some studies associate the short-run overreaction hypothesis with microstructure 
biases. Kaul and Nimalendran (1990) report that short-term overreaction 
profitability stems from the large bid-ask spreads of Nasdaq securities. They collect 
bid-to-bid data and document that in this new sample, a momentum rather than a 
reversal effect is observed. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) arrive at a similar 
conclusion. They find that results based on industry strategies reveal the same 
positive and negative persistence in share returns consistent with Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) and DeBondt and Thaler (1985) respectively. Nonetheless, the 
industry strategy does not generate the short-term reversal found by Jegadeesh 
(1990), but the continuation effect. They argue that their industry-based analysis 
causes microstructure effects to disappear. 
However, the critique of the above studies does not appear to be robust. A large 
number of investigations have shown that short-term reversal profitability remains 
economically and statistically significant after controlling for market frictions. 
Using UK data, Antoniou et al. (2002) demonstrate that results remain similar 
whether they use bid-to-bid or conventional data. In addition, they control for 
infrequent trading by removing shares that have not traded for four consecutive 
weeks, and document that in this new sample similar results are found to those 
reported in the full sample. 
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Other academics link short-term predictability to security trading volume (e. g., 
Hameed and Ting, 2000). These studies show that contrarian profits are positively 
related to stock trading volume. The high trading volume sub-sample generates 
significantly larger contrarian profits than the low trading volume portfolio. 
Although these studies suggest that trading volume can assist in explaining the 
magnitude of the profits earned by the short-run overreaction effect, volume does 
not account for all of the abnormal returns achieved. Low trading volume firms 
continue to generate positive contrarian profitability. 
In short, after Howe (1986), Dyl and Maxfield (1987), Lehmann (1990) and 
Jegadeesh (1990) documented evidence of short-term overreaction in share returns, 
studies focused on explaining the anomaly. Nevertheless, neither microstructure 
effects nor trading volume appear able to explain the short-term overreaction 
profitability. Further analysis is required into the rationale behind the short-term 
reversal effect. 
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3.4 MOMENTUM EFFECT 
3.4.1 Evidence 
In order to address the issues raised in long- and short-term overreaction effects, 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) undertook a pioneering study, which discovered the 
momentum effect. The key difference is that they examined the pattern in portfolios 
of between three and twelve months. 
Jegadeesh and Titman rank securities based on their performance in the previous 
three, six, nine and twelve months. Corresponding to each rank, they construct ten 
equal-weighted portfolios and calculate the performance of these decile portfolios in 
the subsequent three, six, nine and twelve test months. They compute momentum 
profitability by subtracting from the performance of the winner category, the return 
of the loser portfolio. They also repeat the above procedure by skipping a week 
between the rank and test period, to avoid market friction problems that have been 
documented in the short-term overreaction anomaly (e. g., Jegadeesh, 1990). 
In contrast to the short- and long-term overreaction effects, Jegadeesh and Titman 
find evidence of a continuation pattern in security returns. The prior winner (loser) 
portfolio over the past three to twelve months remains a winner (loser) portfolio 
over the following three to twelve months. Almost all the alternative strategies 
generate significant momentum profitability. The most profitable strategy is the 
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twelve months rank with a three month holding period, where the winner shares 
outperformed their loser counterparts by 1.49 per cent per month2. 
Jegadeesh's and Titman's findings appear robust when international data are, used. 
Momentum profits are strong in 12 developed European markets (Rouwenhorst, 
1998), in 29 out of 37 international markets (Griffin et al., 2003), in 17 out of 20 
emerging stock exchanges (Rouwenhorst, 1999), in most of the countries of the G- 
7: USA, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan (Bacmann et al., 2001) and 
in Asian markets with the exception of Japan and Korea (Chui et al., 2000). 
Consistent with Griffin et al. (2003), the average monthly momentum profits are 
1.63,0.78,0.32,0.77 and 0.49 per cent in Africa, America (excluding the US 
market), Asia, Europe and the whole world respectively. With UK data, there is a 
disagreement on whether momentum abnormal profits are achievable. Liu et al. 
(1999) show that continuation profitability is strong over the 1977-1998 period. 
However, Hon and Tonks (2003) use some of the UK companies listed on the LSE, 
and argue that momentum strategies are not profitable before 1976. 
Momentum strategies also appear to work in practical settings, since professional 
traders appear to employ momentum strategies for selecting stocks. Burch and 
Swaminathan (2001) investigate institutional investors' holding of stocks based on 
past share returns. They find that professional traders tend to increase their holdings 
for previous winner shares and slightly decrease their holdings for prior loser stocks. 
2 Rey and Schmid (2003), using the Swiss market, report that considering only the best (worst) past 
return stock to indicate the winner (loser) `portfolio', there is a significant increase of the magnitude 
of momentum profitability up to 4 per cent per month. 
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Grinblatt et al. (1995) examine 274 mutual funds and report that 77 per cent of the 
managers use the momentum investment tool. Brozynski et al. (2003), using 
primary survey data, state that the momentum strategy is a very widely used 
investing tool among fund managers in Germany. Riley (1999) reports that the 
winner fund manager in Standard and Poor's Micropal award in 1999 stated that he 
frequently followed continuation investment strategies. 
Carhart (1997) investigates the persistence of equity mutual fund managers. Fund 
managers that achieved the highest (lowest) past performances over the previous 
year continue to perform well (disappointingly) over the following year. The best 
decile mutual funds outperform the counterpart worst decile mutual funds by 8 per 
cent per year. A four-factor model that considers the three factors from the three- 
factor model (Fama and French, 1993) and the momentum factor 
(R, 
1 - Ri,, =ap+, 
ßp (R, 
n,, -Rf,, 
) + sPSMB, + hPHMLt +m WMLL +ep,, ) can explain 
nearly half of the abnormal profits between the funds with the best and worst 
performances. The best (worst) decile mutual funds are strongly positive (negative) 
associated with the momentum factor, which shows ' that the performance of fund 
managers is strongly associated whether they follow the momentum strategy. 
Extending the investigation beyond share returns, the momentum effect tends to 
persist even using industry and international stock index returns. Countries and 
industries that demonstrate the best (lowest) performance over the previous three to 
twelve months remain good (poor) countries and industries over the subsequent 
three to twelve months. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) report that industry returns 
exhibit a degree of continuation, and Chan et al. (2000), employing 23 international 
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markets, and Bhojraj and Swaminathan (2001), using 38 international countries and 
16 developed countries, find that the international stock index returns demonstrate 
momentum. 
3.4.2 Alternative Explanations 
Because of the robustness of Jegadeesh's and Titman's finding, academics have 
attempted to explain the anomaly. Similar to the long- and short-term overreaction 
effects, they have followed various interesting ideas and methodologies without 
reaching a consensus. Unlike in the long- and short-term reversal studies, academics 
have identified different potential factors and employed alternative methodologies 
to study the momentum effect. 
A number of studies attempt to rationalise the abnormal profits earned by 
momentum strategies in terms of risk. On the one hand, Ang et al. (2001) link the 
higher return of winners to the higher downside risk that they display. Winners 
demonstrate higher performance than their loser counterparts because they are 
characterised by higher correlation with the market index in a declining market. 
However, Fama and French (1996), using US data, and Liu et al. (1999), using UK 
data, find that the three-factor model (Fama and French, 1993) cannot explain 
momentum profitability. The monthly risk-adjusted abnormal returns of the winner 
portfolio remain significantly higher than those of its loser counterpart. 
There is also a debate about the significance of the industry factor in explaining the 
momentum effect. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) argue that an industry factor can 
explain the momentum hypothesis. They create industry portfolios and sort them on 
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their past six-month returns. Firms in the three industries with the highest 
performance are bought, while the three industries with the lowest returns are sold 
short. The performances of these six industries are tracked over the subsequent six 
months. Momentum profits are then computed by calculating the performance of the 
winner industries minus the return of the loser industries. By following the industry 
momentum strategy, investors are able to generate returns of 0.43 per cent per 
month (t-statistic=4.24). Furthermore, by subtracting an industry return from the 
corresponding share return, the individual momentum strategy can generate only 
economically insignificant profits of 0.13 per cent per month. 
However Moskowitz's and Grinblatt's results are not replicated when using 
different data-sets. Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) exclude Nasdaq stocks from 
Moskowitz's and Grinblatt's sample, and examine an alternative breakdown for 
defining winners and losers. They argue that in these circumstances, the individual 
momentum strategy experiences significant positive profits. Nijman et al. (2002) 
report that industries have only a relatively weak role in explaining the profitability 
of momentum strategies in European stock markets. Industry-based strategies can 
explain only 30 per cent of momentum profitability compared with 60 per cent 
achieved for individual shares. 
Findings conflict even over the significance of business cycles for continuation 
payoffs. On the one hand, Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), using information from 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) to define the position of the 
business cycle, document that the magnitude of momentum profits is influenced by 
the stage of the business cycle of an economy. The difference between momentum 
51 
Chapter 3A literature review of the winner-loser anomaly 
profitability in expansionary and recessionary periods is economically and 
statistically significant, at 1.25 per cent per month. On the other hand, Griffin et al. 
(2003) demonstrate that the number of stock markets experiencing positive 
persistence during periods of recession (negative GDP growth) is the same (17 out 
of 22) as those showing positive persistence during periods of positive GDP growth. 
Another possible explanation of the anomaly suggests that different momentum 
profits are generated in different trading volume sub-samples. Lee and Swaminathan 
(2000) sort shares into portfolios based on past returns and trading volume, and 
show that securities with high trading volumes display greater momentum 
profitability than their low trading volume counterparts. In the representative 
momentum strategy, where a six month rank period and a six month test period are 
analysed, a high minus low trading volume portfolio creates an abnormal profit of 
0.91 per cent per month. 
Although this study highlights the significance of trading volume in explaining 
some of the magnitude of momentum profitability, trading volume cannot subsume 
the momentum effect. Shares with low trading volume still experience positive 
profits due to the momentum strategy. Further, Drew et al. (2004), using Australian 
data from 1988 to 2002, report contradictory findings concerning the rank and test 
periods selected. Even though their findings concur with the results of Lee and 
Swaminathan when a rank (test) period of three (six) months is used, they conflict 
when rank and test periods are twelve months; firms with high (low) past trading 
volume generate 0.29 (1.1) per cent per month momentum profitability. 
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Studies have calculated the momentum profitability that is generated following bull 
and bear markets. Cooper et al. (2002), employing US data from between 1929 and 
1995, report that momentum profits are stronger following bull markets; momentum 
profits that follow positive `market returns are 0.93 per cent per month and 
continuation payoffs that follow negative market returns are -0.37 per cent per 
month. 
However, Rey and Schmid (2003) argue that the opposite finding emerges. Using 
data from the Swiss Market, Rey and Schmid state that momentum profits are 
stronger in a sub-period where a bear market is present. The results of Griffin et al. 
(2003) concur with this finding and report that the monthly momentum profitability 
following bear (bull) markets is 1.53 (1.27) per cent in Africa, 0.77 (0.73) per cent 
in America, 0.55 (-0.10) per cent in Asia, 0.68 (0.76) per cent in Europe and 1.04 
(0.31) per cent in US. 
Findings from different studies are contradictory when academics investigate the 
influence of size on the magnitude of momentum profitability. Hou et al. (2003), 
using UK data, construct portfolios sorting first by past performance and then, by 
market capitalisation: they divide each past return portfolio (e. g., winners) into ten 
portfolios based on size. They find that momentum profits peak on the second and 
the seventh portfolios. This finding contradicts Hong et al. (2000), who use US data, 
and Doukas and McKnight (2003), who employ European data, since they report 
that beyond the first few small capitalisation portfolios, there is a continuous decline 
of momentum profits as the investor moves to portfolios of shares with higher 
market values. 
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Behavioural models have also been developed to rationalise the momentum 
hypothesis. Grinblatt and Han (2001) present a model that suggests that the 
disposition of investors to sell winners too quickly and to hold on to losers too long 
can explain the observed pattern in share returns. Loser share prices do not fall far 
enough, and need time to adjust to their fundamental values, while winner share 
prices do not rise enough and require some time to regain their equilibrium levels 
based on company fundamentals. Therefore, there is a positive spread between 
prices and their fundamental values for winners and a negative spread for losers. 
The momentum effect is generated by this convergence in which winners should 
have higher returns than losers. 
George and Hwang (2004) also develop a behavioural model to explain their 
empirical findings. They introduce a new momentum strategy called the `52-week 
high strategy'. Buying (sell short) stocks that are near (far from) their 52-week high, 
investors can generate approximately double the profitability of the conventional 
momentum strategy (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) and the industry momentum 
strategy applied by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999). They explain this finding as 
follows: investors expect that shares that are close to the 52-week high will exhibit 
bearish conditions in the future, even though public information can promise further 
increases in share prices. The information finally prevails, generating a delayed 
increase in stock prices. 
In short, although most findings highlight the robustness of the momentum effect 
when academics use different data, explanation of the rationale behind the effect 
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appears to be the most intriguing issue in the literature. The alternative explanations 
of the effect are not unanimously supported by different data sets and 
methodologies. Neither risk, an industry factor, the business cycle, trading volume, 
bull and bear markets nor behavioural finance appear able to subsume the 
momentum effect. Further examination is required of the rationale behind the 
momentum hypothesis. 
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3.5 RECONCILIATION OF LONG-TERM REVERSAL EFFECT, SHORT- 
RUN OVERREACTION HYPOTHESIS AND MOMENTUM EFFECT 
The previous three sections reported that all three anomalies produce similar effects 
over different time horizons. A large number of studies have attempted to rationalise 
the results, but academics are far from reaching a consensus regarding the various 
explanations that have been advanced. In order to reveal the significance of cross- 
references among the three effects, the following section reviews studies that 
rationalise more than one part of the winner-loser anomaly. Overall, the research 
reviewed draws on the behavioural finance literature and reports more convincing 
results. 
In an attempt to explain the whole winner-loser effect rather than focussing only on 
part of the literature, Fama (1998) considers the underreaction and overreaction 
anomalies as a whole, rather than individually. Since academics report 
underreaction results (such as the momentum effect) as often as overreaction 
findings (such as the short- and long-term overreaction anomalies), Fama argues 
that, on average, these results are nothing more than deviations from the average 
market efficiency. 
Recently, behavioural models, have also been developed to account for the 
momentum and the long-term overreaction effects, but not for the short-term 
reversal hypothesis. Barberis et al. (1998) highlight the significance of investor 
sentiment to explain the winner-loser anomaly. They consider the trading patterns of 
investors within different uncertainty level. According to the model, the earnings of 
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companies follow the random walk, however investors believe that earnings are 
either mean-reverting or trending based on their expectations. Evidence in the field 
of psychology shows that when people observe a variable trend, then because of the 
`conservatism bias' (Edwards, 1968) they believe that the trend will reverse. 
Therefore, when investors observe a variable trend among positive and negative 
past earning results of a company, investors believe that such a trend will reverse 
itself. Due to their expectations, they underreact to new information, and the 
momentum effect is generated. Similarly, findings in the field of psychology shows 
that when people observe a clear trend, then because of the `representativeness 
heuristic bias' (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) they believe that in the future the 
trend will continue. Therefore, when there exists a series of positive or negative 
earnings results, investors expect that future signals will follow the same trend. Due 
to this outlook, they overreact to present information, and the long-run overreaction 
effect is created. 
Daniel et al. (1998) develop another behavioural model to reconcile the momentum 
and the long-term overreaction effects. They employ different concepts from 
psychology than Barberis et al (1998). According to the overconfidence bias, 
investors overestimate the reliability of their private information, while they neglect 
the public information. Consistent to attribution theory (Bem, 1965), investors 
observe the outcomes of their actions and they update their confidence for their 
ability to pick winner share. If public information confirms investors' private 
information, the continuing overreaction of informed investors generates the 
momentum effect. Notice that this explanation of the momentum effect is 
contradicted with the literature, since it states that the momentum effect stems from 
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a continuous overreaction rather than the usual concept of underreaction. If however 
the public signal contradicts the information that informed investors have, traders' 
confidence tends to fall because of the attribution bias and prices gradually revert to 
fundamentals. Therefore, the long-term overreaction effect appears. 
In addition, Kim (2002) explains the momentum effect based on Andressen and 
Kraus (1988)'s finding that when prices display a significant trend over a period, 
objects tend to follow the trend. Stated differently, investors tend to buy a stock 
when its prices rise and to sell a share when its prices fall. The stronger the prices 
movement is, the stronger the tendency of investors to follow the trend. Where 
investors' decisions are based on this finding, continuation in the pattern of prices is 
displayed. In the long-term, the trend gradually declines because of the exit from the 
market of former momentum traders, and share prices revert to fundamental 
generating the long-term overreaction effect. 
Focusing on agents rather than on cognitive biases, Hong and Stein (1999) and Du 
(2002) present two alternative behavioural models in order to explain both the 
momentum and the long-term overreaction effects. The behavioural model of Hong 
and Stein (1999) bases on two rational agents; newswatchers and momentum 
traders. Newswatchers observe some private information, but fail to be aware of the 
information that other investors have. Therefore, when private information of 
investors become public, prices adjust to new information and the momentum effect 
appears. Stated differently, the continuation hypothesis stems from the gradual 
expansion of information among investors. `Momentum traders' are investors that 
follow the trend. Initially momentum investors implement simple strategies and 
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achieve profits, eliminating quickly any underreaction. However, momentum 
investors eventually drive security prices to levels that are higher than their 
fundamental values and therefore, a subsequent reversal in share prices is generated. 
Within that price pattern, early momentum investors gain profits and late 
momentum traders generate loses. 
Du (2002) suggests that there exist investors with confidence and non-confidence. 
Investors with a great deal of confidence buy and sell equities rapidly in order to 
adapt to new information, but traders with low confidence hesitate before making a 
decision. Because of the underreaction of low confident investors, an underreaction 
to information is evident and the momentum effect appears. On receipt of positive 
news, most investors buy shares immediately. A rapid increase in price encourages 
investors with lower confidence to consider adapting their position and the entry of 
more and more of them leads prices to rise above their fundamental values. 
Subsequently, prices revert to equilibrium once investors recognise the wrong 
valuation. 
Since the publication of these theoretical models, academics have researched 
whether these models are supported by empirical data. Overall, the existing limited 
evidence seems to confirm the behavioural models. Bloomfield and Hales (2001) 
support the model of Barberis et al. (1998). In a psychological experiment, they 
demonstrate that 38 MBA-students underreact in circumstances where there are 
many reversals, but overreact to situations with repeated continuations. 
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Daniel and Titman (1999) examine whether the Daniel et al. (1998) model is 
supported when empirical data are in use. According to the model, the momentum 
effect stems from the overconfident investors and therefore, the momentum effect is 
likely to be stronger in shares that are difficult for valuation. They define this 
characteristic according to the book-to-market ratio of companies. Valuation of 
companies with low book-to-market ratios is more uncertain, since the valuation 
procedure bases on expected news and growth options, than the counterpart 
companies with high book-to-market values. Daniel and Titman (1999) support the 
Daniel et al. (1998) model because they report that momentum profits are stronger 
for securities that need subjective valuation. Shares with low book-to-market ratios 
experience higher continuation profitability than securities with high book-to- 
market values. 
Hong et " al. (2000), using US data, and Doukas and McKnight (2003), using 
information from 13 European countries, investigate whether the model of Hong 
and Stein (1999) holds using empirical data. They associate the speed of 
information that flows among investors with the size and the analyst coverage of 
companies. Information spreads slower among investors within companies with 
small capitalisation and with low analyst coverage rather than the counterpart 
companies with large capitalisation and with high analyst coverage. They support 
the theoretical findings of Hong and Stein behavioural model, since they report that 
continuation profits are higher for small than for large capitalisation shares, and for 
securities with low, rather than high, analyst coverage. 
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Chui et al. (2003) compare two of the behavioural models in respect of their ability 
to rationalise the momentum effect. Their analysis is based on the momentum 
profitability demonstrated in the real estate investment trusts (REITs) industry over 
different time periods. After 1990, shares in this industry have been much more 
difficult to value and they were characterised by more comprehensive analyst 
coverage. Therefore, according to Daniel et al. (1998), momentum profits should be 
stronger in the post-1990 period because the valuation was less certain. However, 
consistent with Hong and Stein (1999), continuation profitability should be higher 
in the pre-1990 period, because the spread of information was slower. Chui et al. 
support the Daniel et al. behavioural model because momentum profits in REITs are 
significantly greater after 1990. 
In short, some studies have been able to account for more than one part of the 
winner-loser effect. This type of investigation is relatively recent, and is 
concentrated in the behavioural finance literature. The existing empirical findings, 
although limited, appear to support the theoretical predictions. Nevertheless, further 
cross-reference among the three anomalies needs to be carried out, even beyond the 
behavioural finance field. Almost none of the explanations rationalise all three parts 
of the winner-loser anomaly. 
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3.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented the literature review of the winner-loser effect. The 
conviction is that a close relationship exists among momentum and short- and long- 
term overreaction effects. All three are similar effects, but they operate over 
different time horizons. Therefore, the whole winner-loser anomaly was surveyed, 
rather than focussing on part of the literature only. Although most findings 
highlighted the robustness of the winner-loser effect demonstrated using different 
data sets, the rationale behind the effect appears to be the most intriguing issue in 
the literature. The alternative explanations of the effect were not unanimously 
supported by different data sets and methodologies; this indicates the need for 
further investigation into what generates the anomaly. This study examines in depth 
the momentum effect and aims to investigate factors that influence the momentum 
profitability that have not previously been identified (Tables 3.1,3.2). 
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Chapter 4 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data and methodology 
4.1 DATA SELECTION 
This study utilises three different samples (Table 4.1). In the full sample, monthly 
share returns of over 6,000 shares are collected from the London Share Price 
Database (LSPD) from January 1975 to October 2001. In the accounting sub- 
sample, accounting information on annual market value, book-to-market and trading 
volume of over 2,000 companies is collected from Datastream for an identical 
period. In the SETS sample, approximately 150 shares are selected that have been 
traded in the auction Stock Exchange Electronic Trading System (SETS) after 
October 1997. 
Table 4.2 presents descriptive return statistics for the three samples. The average 
monthly return is 1.21 per cent for the full sample, 0.93 per cent for the accounting 
sub-sample and 0.35 per cent for the SETS sample. The SETS sample generates 
lower returns, since it is influenced by the bear market that occurred after the 
summer of 2000. Full sample, accounting and SETS sub-samples have a similar 
standard deviation. The skewness coefficients in all samples are negative showing 
skewness to the left. The kurtosis coefficients are significantly larger than 3 
indicating that return distributions are leptokurtic and hence, data are peaked 
relative to the normal distribution. These results concur with other studies (e. g., 
Harris and Kucukozmen, 2001; Gettinby et al., 2004), which show that returns are 
not normally distributed. This study employs parametric as well as non-parametric 
tests to control for non-normality. 
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Chapter 4 
Table 4.2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Data and methodology 
Full sample Accounting Sub-sample SETS sample 
Mean 1.21% 0.93% 0.35% 
Standard deviation 0.129 0.127 0.128 
Skewness -0.62 -0.22 -0.69 
Kurtosis 18.40 17.09 9.38 
4.1.1 Full Sample 
This sample covers the period from January 1975 to October 2001. Before 1975, 
LSPD covers only part of the securities that were quoted on the UK stock market; 
only a random sample of 33 per cent of the full sample is displayed. After 1975, 
LSPD offers full coverage of all UK companies quoted on the LSE. The full sample 
covers all UK listed companies in the Master Index File. Over 6,000 listed and de- 
listed shares (companies that no longer exist) are examined'. The number of firms 
analysed in any given year ranges from 1,489 to 2,444 (Figure 4.1) where the 
number of companies examined tends to slightly decrease throughout the period. 
This happens because the number of listed shares on the LSE tends to decline. 
In LSPD, monthly share returns are calculated as: 
R« =1n 
(p1, r + d,,, ) 
p1, '-1 
(4.1) 
1 The inclusion of dead companies ensures that the sample is free of survivorship bias. The sample 
contains companies that have entered or exited during the sample period. 
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where R« is the return of share i in time t, p,,, is the last recorded price for 
security i in month t, pr,, _, 
is the last recorded price in the previous month and 
dr., represents the dividends that have been paid between t -1 and t. 
Notice that LSPD share returns demonstrate a large non-trading indicator. There 
exist shares not traded over the last day of the month. Therefore, monthly returns 
reflect transactions that may occur days before the end of the month. Clare et al. 
(2002) use LSPD monthly returns and find that the non-trading indicator is more 
intense in the period from 1975 and 1981 and when small capitalisation companies 
are employed. The problem of non-trading can influence the autocorrelation of 
portfolio returns. Prices of non-frequent shares display a lag until the new 
information is impounded in them, but prices of frequently traded shares reflect 
quickly the new information. When both frequent and non-frequent shares form a 
portfolio, then frequent shares reflect information of time t and non-frequent shares 
reflect information of time t-1, generating an autocorrelation in portfolio returns. 
This study follows alternative tests to ensure that momentum profits do not stem 
from non-trading; I calculate the magnitude of continuation profits only in large 
capitalisation shares that do not exhibit the thin trading problem and I consider the 
momentum profitability generated for each test period separately to ensure that 
profits do not arise only during 1975-1981. 
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Chapter 4 
4.1.2 Accounting Sub-Sample 
Data and methodology 
In the accounting sub-sample, over 2,000 live and dead stocks are collected using an 
identical period to that employed with the full sample; from January 1975 to 
October 2001. Accounting information on annual market value (datatype; MV), 
book-to-market (datatype; MTBV-reversed) and relative trading volume (number of 
shares traded VO divided by the total number of shares outstanding NOSH) is 
collected from Datastream. Trading volume data are selected only in the post-1991 
period because of the limited turnover data available before 1991. 
Monthly share returns come from the LSPD, because Datastream does not record 
detailed dividend payments before 1988 that could have been used to calculate share 
returns. The matching of LSPD with Datastream was achieved through the Master 
Index File, which displays the SEDOL codes. These SEDOL codes were in a few 
cases mistaken, since codes of delisted companies were re-used. I solved this 
problem by checking company names in all LSPD-Datastream matches. 
The number of companies examined in any given year varies from 442 to 1,143 
(Figure 4.2). Therefore, the number of shares analysed in the accounting sub-sample 
is much smaller than the number examined in the full sample. This happens because 
when one matches LSPD and Datastream, some shares recorded on the LSPD are 
not found on Datastream. 
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4.1.3 SETS Sample 
The Stock Exchange Electronic Trading System (SETS) sample is used only in 
chapter 6, when this study investigates the momentum profits generated in shares 
traded in alternative trading structures. This sample extends from October 1997 to 
October 2001 and includes stocks that have been traded under the auction SETS 
mechanism. The selection of around 150 UK shares under the SETS system comes 
from the LSE database2. This database includes the company names and their 
SEDOL. codes, and, therefore, makes it feasible to obtain monthly return 
information from LSPD, and accounting information on market value from 
Datastream. 
2 http: //www. londonstockexchange. com/trading/sets/about_15. asp 
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4.2 CALCULATION OF MOMENTUM PROFITABILITY 
For the calculation of momentum profits only the representative momentum strategy 
is examined (6x6), where a six month ranking period with a six month test period 
are analysed (Figure 4.3). The majority of papers (e. g., Liu et al., 1999) follow this 
momentum strategy to investigate factors that influence momentum profitability. 
This study follows the same representative strategy in order for our findings to be 
comparable with the results of other research papers. Besides both Liu et al. (1999) 
and Hon and Tonks (2003) use UK data and report that the momentum effect tends 
to persist using various rank and test periods. This study does not consider essential 
to undertake the same test using a similar data set. 
The first rank period is from January to June 1975. The performance of each share 
is calculated as: 
RPR, = R;, (4.2) 
r. -7 
where RPR, is the rank period return of security i and R, is the return of security 
i in month t over the past six months; from -7 month to -1 month. Based on 
theirRPR, s, all companies are ranked in ascending order. Shares are divided into 
five portfolios, each group comprising 20 per cent of the full sample. The first 
category (L) consists of shares with the lowest returns, while the fifth portfolio (W) 
includes securities with the best performance3. 
3 Later, in chapter 6, this study defines shares with the best (winners) and worst (losers) 
performances using alternative definitions. Using three portfolios, past winners (W) and losers (L) 
each comprise 30 per cent of the sample. Constructing ten portfolios, winners and losers include the 
top and bottom 10 per cent of shares. 
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Consistent with Jegadeesh (1990), I intend to avoid the market friction problems 
that have been documented in the short-term overreaction effect. Transactions occur 
either in bid or ask prices and hence, share prices recorded include a measurement 
error equal to the bid-ask spread. When security returns are calculated in nearby 
periods, returns display a correlation because of the bid-ask problem (Roll, 1984). 
To eliminate the bid-ask influence, I skip one month (July 1975) and calculate the 
performances of portfolios over the following 6-month test period (August 1975 to 
January 1976). The performance of each portfolio is calculated as: 
Rp . (ý 
R`, 
(4.3) 
r=o rN 
where RP is the return of portfolio p, Nis the number of stocks in each portfolio 
and R1,, is the return of security i in month t over the `future' six months; from 
`now' to six months later. 
This procedure is repeated for each non-overlapping 6-month period. Subsequent 
rank periods are Jul 1975-Dec 1975... July 2000-Dec 2000. Their matching test 
periods are Feb 1976-July 1976... Feb 2001-July 2001. The abnormal profitability is 
indicated by the subtraction of the average Rw (ARW) from the average RL 
(ARL )4. When 
4 Portfolio test statistics are calculated as: 
ARP 
, where 
ARP is the mean monthly return on 
up 
NP 
portfolio p, o.,, 
2 is the variance of portfolio p and NP is the number of observations in portfolio p. 
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AR W- ARL >05 (4.4) 
the momentum effect appears. When the result of the subtraction is negative, the 
reverse pattern emerges which implies that the overreaction hypothesis is supported. 
When the result is equal to zero, the market efficiency is efficient. 
Notice that transaction costs that investors face in stock markets are ignored. As in 
the majority of studies in the field (e. g., Liu et al., 1999; Hon and Tonks, 2003), it is 
assumed that continuation profits are high enough to cover transaction costs. A cost 
of the magnitude of around 2 per cent cannot outweigh the momentum profitability, 
considering that momentum strategies are not transaction-intensive, and so the 
trading frequency is limited. 
AR w AR- s The winner-loser portfolio test statistic is calculated as: w, where ARW is the mean 
6x 
+6L2i 
Nw NL 
monthly return on the winner portfolio, ARL is the mean monthly return on the loser portfolio, aw 
is the variance of the winner portfolio, cr is the variance of the loser portfolio, NW is the number 
of observations in the winner portfolio and NL is the number of observations in the loser portfolio. 
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Figure 4.3 
Calculation of Momentum Profits 
Data and methodology 
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Chapter 5 
MOMENTUM PROFITS ON THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the initial empirical findings of this thesis regarding the 
profitability of the momentum strategy when analysed for the London Stock 
Exchange. Other studies (e. g., Liu et al., 1999) that employed UK and international 
data found that momentum profits tend to persist. This chapter investigates whether 
evidence of momentum profitability is present using a larger and more 
comprehensive sample of firms. 
This chapter is organised as follows: the next section reports the empirical findings; 
and the final section discusses the foregoing analysis. 
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5.2 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
5.2.1 Momentum Profitability employing the Full Sample 
This section provides the initial empirical evidence, outlining the momentum profits 
generated using the full sample. Table 5.1 shows that the raw monthly portfolio 
returns are 0.05 per cent in the loser portfolio, 0.85 per cent in the second group, 
1.05 per cent in the third group, 1.23 per cent in the fourth portfolio and 1.31 per 
cent in the winner portfolio'. Therefore, past winners outperform past losers on the 
following test period by 1.26 (W-L=1.31-0.05) per cent per month with a t-statistic 
equal to 2.26 (p-value<0.05). Winners outperformed losers in around 85 per cent of 
the test periods. These results indicate that momentum profits are economically and 
statistically significant on the LSE using my sample of firms. These results concur 
with the findings of other studies that use UK (e. g., Liu et al., 1999) and 
international evidence (e. g., Rouwenhorst, 1998). 
The monthly portfolio returns further show that the anomaly is not restricted to the 
extreme winner and loser portfolios. Returns on the intermediate portfolios also 
reflect their prior ranking. Portfolios that achieved high (low) past performances 
tended to generate high (low) returns in the following period. This finding has been 
often unnoticed in the literature. 
Table 5.1 further shows that momentum profits remain economically significant in 
three equal sub-periods, but that profits vary across the different sub-periods. 
Monthly continuation profitability is on average 0.75 per cent from 1975-1983,1.71 
Numbers considered on the document are underlined on the corresponding Tables. 
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per cent from 1984-1992 and 1.33 per cent from 1993 to 2001. Momentum profits 
are driven by the winner portfolio between 1975-1983 and by the loser portfolio 
between 1984-1992 and 1993-2001. The profits for each test period may be further 
analysed. Figure 5.1 shows the portfolio performances and Figure 5.2 shows the 
momentum profits achieved from 1975 to 2001. This study reports that momentum 
profitability is significantly higher over the 1990-1993 sub-period. The finding that 
momentum profits are not persistent during different time periods for the LSE 
concurs with the results of Hon and Tonks (2003), who demonstrate that momentum 
strategies are not profitable in the sub-period from 1955 to 1976. However they are 
different from the findings of Liu et al. (1999), who suggest approximately the same 
momentum profitability between 1977-1987 and 1988-1998. 
Using market-adjusted monthly portfolio performances, the magnitude of 
momentum profits is, as expected, exactly the same (1.26 per cent per month). The 
monthly market-adjusted portfolio returns are -1.29 per cent for losers, -0.48 per 
cent for the second group, -0.28 per cent for the third portfolio, -0.10 per cent for 
the fourth portfolio and -0.02 per cent for winners. The negative portfolio returns 
come from the choice of the value-weighted FTSE All Share index to proxy for the 
market. This finding is crucial considering the limitation of short selling in some 
countries. A strategy that buys the winner portfolio does not provide larger profits 
than the market index. 
I also investigate whether there is a statistical difference in all five portfolio returns 
simultaneously. I found that portfolio returns are economically different among the 
five portfolios and now I examine whether they are also statistically different. I 
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employ the one-way analysis of Variance (ANOVA) that shows the variation 
among the sample means in comparison with the variation within the samples. 
Using the portfolio returns, the F statistic is 2.047 with a p-value at 0.088, which 
shows that portfolio returns are not statistically different at 5% level. In other 
words, although winners outperform significantly losers, all five portfolios do not 
generate statistical significant different returns. 
Appendix 5.1 investigates whether the selection of parametric statistics are 
appropriate and examines the statistical significance of the W-L returns when non- 
parametric statistics are employed. 
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Table 5.1 ' 
Momentum Profits using the Full Sample 
Raw Returns 
Full Period 1975-1983 1984-1992 1993-2001 
L 0.05% 1.38% -0.78% -0.46% 
0.11 3.26 -0.85 -0.68 2 0.85% 1.73% 0.28% 0.54% 
2.54 4.22 0.36 1.17 
3 1.05% 1.87% 0.66% 0.63% 
3.38 4.60 0.91 1.50 
4 1.23% 2.01% 0.94% 0.74% 
3.97 5.14 1.28 1.82 
W 
. 
1.31% 2.13% 0.93% 0.87% 
3.51 5.25 1.04 1.57 
W-L 1.26% 0.75% 1.71% 1.33% 
2.26 1.27 1.33 1.53 
Market-adjusted returns 
Full Period 
-1.29% 
-4.61 
-0.48% 
-2.52 
-0.28% 
-1.75 
-0.10% 
-0.64 
-0.02% 
-0.11 
1.26% 
3.54 
This table shows the momentum profits generated using the full sample. Shares are ranked based on 
their previous 6-month returns and five equal-weighted portfolios are formed. The performance of 
these quintile portfolios is calculated in the subsequent 6 months, after skipping a month between 
rank and test period. The momentum profitability (W-L) results from the subtraction of the 
performance of the past winner (W) from that of the prior loser (L) portfolio. 
Two-tailed tests are used throughout the thesis. 
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5.2.2 Momentum Profits and Calculation of Abnormal Returns 
Conrad and Kaul (1993) argue that the long-term overreaction effect arises from the 
inappropriate calculation of abnormal returns. They use the buy-and-hold approach 
where single-period returns are compounded, rather than using the typical 
cumulative abnormal return method, and they report that the strategy provides 
negative profits. Dissanaike (1994) reports that a simple arithmetic method, which 
has been employed in the present thesis, biases the measurement of rank and test 
period returns. Therefore, this study adopts an alternative method to calculate the 
momentum profits. Share returns over the rank and test periods are measured as: 
T 
fl(1+R; 
1)-1 (5.1) 
Figure 5.3 compares the momentum profits generated by the arithmetic and the 
compounding alternative and shows that the abnormal profits of the momentum 
strategy do not arise from the inappropriate methodology. When the compounding 
method is employed, the momentum strategy provides even stronger abnormal 
profits at the magnitude of 1.89 per cent per month. Interestingly, the momentum 
profits generated using the two alternatives are highly correlated with a Pearson 
correlation equal to 0.95. These findings arrive at a similar conclusion with Power 
et al. (2001) who report that when the compound method to measure abnormal 
returns is used, the long-term overreaction strategy achieves even more impressive 
profits. 
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5.2.3 Momentum Profits using the Accounting Sub-Sample 
This section investigates whether the main findings come from the full sample 
persist when the accounting sub-sample is used; which employs data for around 
2000 companies with additional accounting data. Table 5.2 shows the momentum 
gains earned on the accounting sub-sample over the full period (Panel A) and during 
the 1975-1983 (Panel B), 1984-1992 (Panel C) and 1993-2001 (Panel D) sub- 
periods. Figure 5.4 shows the momentum profits generated using the full sample 
and the accounting sub-sample from 1975 to 2001. Findings show that the 
accounting dataset generates similar momentum gains to the full sample. The 
monthly continuation profits in the accounting sub-sample are on average 1.36 (t- 
statistic=3.88) per cent from 1975 to 2001,0.77 (1.53) per cent from 1975 to 1983, 
1.70 (2.52) per cent from 1984 to 1992 and 1.59 (2.67) per cent from 1993 to 2001. 
These suggest that the momentum effect exhibits a similar magnitude of gains when 
different data sets are employed. 
Using the accounting sub-sample, accounting information on portfolios can be 
presented. As expected, shares in the most recent sub-period exhibit significantly 
higher market capitalisation and trading volume, and lower book-to-market values 
because of the continuing bull markets. The abnormal performance that is in present 
in the accounting sub-sample cannot be explained by the size effect. The winner 
portfolio tends to include higher market value securities than the loser 
portfolio (Sizew_L > 0) . Figure 5.5 plots the size of the arbitrage portfolio (W-L) 
from 1975 to 2001. 
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In addition, following the methodology of Zarowin (1990), this study analyses 
separately the periods when losers are smaller than, and larger than winners. 
Zarowin investigates the magnitude of long-term overreaction profits using this 
approach and finds that when losers have lower capitalisation than their winner 
counterparts, there is evidence of overreaction and when losers are larger than 
winners, no evidence of overreaction is present in the return data. Searching for the 
momentum profits, I report that when winners are larger than losers, winners 
outperform losers by 1.55 per cent per month. When winners demonstrate a lower 
market value than their loser counterparts, winners outperform losers by lower gains 
at the magnitude of 0.92 per cent per month. These results indicate that following 
the methodology of Zarowin (1990), the size effect cannot explain the momentum 
profits, since momentum gains are stronger when winners are larger than losers. 
Figure, 5.7, which plots the trading volume of the arbitrage portfolio from 1991 to 
2001, and Table 5.2 demonstrate that winners tend to be associated with higher 
trading volume than losers (TradingVolumeW_L > 0). Table 5.2 and Figure 5.6 show 
that a monotonic trend is demonstrated in the book-to-market, where there is a fall 
when we move from losers to winners. This finding is consistent with Liu et al. 
(1999) and indicates that winners tend to be glamour stocks (e. g., dot companies), 
while losers seem to be value equities. 
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Table 5.2 
Momentum Profits Employing the Accounting Sub-Sample 
Returns t-statistics 
Size B/M Trading Volume 
(£ millions) (No of shares traded/No 
of outstanding shares) 
Panel A: Full Period 
L 0.00% -0.01 232.40 1.86 0.62 
2 0.72% 3.59 495.27 1.35 0.64 
3 0.97% 5.46 619.12 1.21 0.64 
4 1.07% 5.86 702.82 1.16 0.69 
W 1.35% 6.41 501.36 0.98 0.87 
W-L 1.36% 3.88 268.96 -0.87 0.25 
Panel B: 1975-1983 
L 2.02% 5.13 34.77 3.24 N/A 
2 2.27% 7.46 59.50 2.26 N/A 
3 2.40% 7.80 62.22 2.03 N/A 
4 2.53% 8.39 72.14 1.95 N/A 
W 2.79% 8.83 60.07 1.48 N/A 
W-L 0.77% 1.53 25.30 -1.76 N/A 
Panel C: 1984-1992 
L -0.52% -1.01 100.28 1.27 0.44 
2 0.44% 1.21 308.25 1.02 0.53 
3 0.99% 3.16 402.45 1.01 0.55 
4 1.14% 3.22 345.74 0.98 0.57 
W 1.18% 2.70 281.60 0.99 0.69 
W-L 1.70% 2.52 171.32 -0.37 0.25 
Panel D: 1993-2001 
L -0.78% -1.62 543.84 1.11 0.66 
2 0.14% 0.37 1143.69 0.73 0.66 
3 0.26% 0.85 1385.41 0.65 0.66 
4 0.27% 0.94 1635.71 0.57 0.73 
W 0.80% 2.32 1125.70 0.51 0.91 
W-L 1.59% 2.67 616.02 -0.52 0.25 
This table demonstrates the momentum profits generated using the accounting sub-sample. 
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5.2.4 A Correlation Matrix for forthcoming Explanation Variables 
This chapter provides an introduction to establish that momentum profits do exist 
when my sample is employed. Over the next chapters, I will investigate different 
factors that influence the momentum profits. This section examines the correlations 
among those factors to examine whether forthcoming results are may associated. 
Over the following chapters, I investigate the association of momentum profits with 
the following variables: 
Bull and bear markets 
The representative definition of bull and bear markets is when I use the market 
return (FTSE All Share) over the rank period. The variable R, n, -6 shows 
the market 
return over the rank period. 
Size and book-to-market values 
I generate nine portfolios; shares are sorted into three groups based on the market 
value and then, each size-sorted portfolio divided further into three portfolios based 
on the book-to-market. SMB, (Small Minus Big) shows the portfolio that buys the 
three small size portfolios and sells short the three big size portfolios. HMLL (High 
Minus Low) shows the portfolio that buys the three high book-to-market portfolios 
and sells short the three low book-to-market portfolios. 
Volatility 
Shares are sorted into five groups based on their standard deviation over the rank 
period. vHML shows the portfolio that buys shares with the highest past volatility 
and sells short shares with the lowest past volatility. 
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Trading volume 
Shares are sorted into three groups based on their trading volume over the one year 
before the test period. tHML shows the portfolio that buys shares with the highest 
past trading volume and sells short shares with the lowest past trading volume. 
Table 5.3 shows the Pearson and Spearman rank correlations to examine the 
association among the variables. Pearson correlations assume that variables are 
normally distributed and Spearman rank correlations are the equivalent non- 
parametric test. Correlations among variables are very low and none is statistical 
significant. The strongest correlation is equal to -0.32 with a statistical insignificant 
p-value equal to 0.17. These findings show that the variables are not significantly 
associated and therefore, the findings among the different chapters are not 
associated either. 
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5.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the momentum profits demonstrated using my sample of 
firms. The momentum profitability found is comparable with that other studies 
reported (e. g.; Liu et al., 1999). This study documented that the anomaly is not 
restricted to the extreme winner and loser portfolios. Returns on the intermediate 
portfolios also reflect their prior ranking. The magnitude of the continuation payoffs 
further varies with the sub-period concerned. Momentum profitability is 
considerably higher between 1990 and 1993. Using market-adjusted monthly 
portfolio performances, this study reported that portfolio returns are negative, when 
the value-weighted FTSE All Share proxies the market. This finding is significant 
considering the limitation of short selling in some countries. A strategy that buys the 
winner portfolio does not provide larger profits than the market index. 
I adopted the compound method of calculation of momentum returns. Conrad and 
Kaul (1993) argue that the long-term overreaction effect arises from the 
inappropriate calculation of abnormal returns and Dissanaike (1994) reports that a 
simple arithmetic method biases the measurement of rank and test period returns. I 
compared the momentum profits generated by the arithmetic and compounding 
alternatives and showed that the abnormal profits of the momentum strategy do not 
arise from the inappropriate methodology. When the compounding method is 
employed, the momentum strategy provides even stronger abnormal profits. 
I further employed the accounting sub-sample that contains over 2000 shares with 
additional accounting data to undertake a robustness test. I found that momentum 
profits are identical when full sample and accounting sub-sample are employed. 
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This result indicates that the momentum effect demonstrates similar magnitude 
gains using different data sets. The abnormal performance that is evident in the 
accounting sub-sample cannot be explained by the size effect. The winner portfolio 
tends to include higher market value securities than the loser portfolio (SizeW_L > 0) 
and momentum profits are larger in magnitude in periods when winners include 
larger size shares than losers. Further analysis showed that winners tend to display 
higher trading volume than losers (TradingVolumeW_L > 0). A monotonic trend is 
demonstrated in the book-to-market, where there is a fall when we move from losers 
to winners. This finding is consistent with Liu et al. (1999) and indicates that 
winners tend to be glamour stocks, while losers seem to be value equities. 
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Appendix 5.1 
Searching for Normality 
I employed conventional t-statistics to investigate the statistical significance of 
momentum profits. However, this assumes that the distribution of momentum gains 
is normal (bell-shaped); t-statistics may generate biased results when employed in a 
non-normal distribution. This appendix aims to investigate whether the selection of 
t-statistics rather than non-parametric tests was proper by examining the normality 
of momentum profits. In other words, I study the following hypothesis: 
Ho: momentum profits fit the normal distribution 
H 1: momentum profits do not fit the normal distribution. 
I construct the histogram of data to judge normality. Figure 5.8 plots the frequencies 
and shows that momentum profits look approximately normal. A better graphical 
technique for assessing normality is based on a probability plot, which compares the 
actual variable points against the values expected from the normal distribution. If 
the sample of momentum profits follows the normal distribution, points will be 
concentrated around a straight line. Figure 5.9 shows that points do almost follow 
the straight line and indicate that momentum profits have a distribution close 
enough to normal to allow the use of t-statistics. 
I further undertake statistical tests to examine the normality of abnormal profits. 
Using only an individual statistical test, you can have a false conclusion, since 
statistical tests can show significance when it does not exist (Type I error) or show 
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that there exists no significance when it does exist (Type II error). Hence, I employ 
various goodness-of-fit tests for robustness. 
Table 5.4 shows the descriptive statistics for momentum profits. The median is 
slightly larger than the average and removing the top and bottom 5 per cent of 
observations the new mean is 1.30 per cent per month that is almost similar with 
that generated by the full sample. These suggest that momentum gains are not 
driven by outliers. The minimum momentum return recorded is -3.29 per cent per 
month and the maximum continuation yield witnessed is 4.60 per cent per month. 
The skewness coefficient is slightly negative (-0.36) showing skewness to the left. 
The kurtosis coefficient is lower than 3 (1.29) indicating that returns distribution is 
platykurtic and hence, data are flat relative to the Gaussian distribution. However, 
since 
skewness 
= -0.355 = -1.06 and 
Kurtosis 
-1.291 = 1.93, both results are StdError 0.333 StdError 0.67 
between -2 and +2. Thus, the distribution of momentum profits 
is normally 
distributed with 5% statistical significance. This suggests that based on kurtosis and 
skewness, a parametric test can be undertaken. 
Another statistical test employed to investigate the normality is that by Jarque-Bera 
(1987) that is based on skewness and kurtosis of the sample. Until now I 
investigated whether momentum profits are normal considering the skewness and 
the kurtosis separately and found that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Now I 
investigate whether this finding persists when I control for these factors 
simultaneously. The Jarque-Bera test is calculated as: 
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JB = n[ 6+ 
(x243)2 
] (5.2) 
where JB is the Jarque-Bera statistic, n shows the number of observations, S shows 
the skewness and K represents the kurtosis. High p-values (at least over 0.05) 
demonstrate that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that momentum profits fit the 
normal distribution. Jarque-Bera statistic takes the value of 7.42 with a p-value 
equal to 0.024. Therefore, employing the Jarque-Bera statistic, I can reject the 
normality assumption at 5% significance. 
I further examine the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which generates the cumulative 
distribution of momentum profits and compares it with the expected cumulative 
normal distribution. The statistic D shows the maximum vertical deviation between 
the two distributions. Using our data, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic D takes the 
value of 0.113 with a significant high p-value of 0.101. This suggests that using the 
Kolmogorov-Smimov test, I cannot reject the null hypothesis for normality of 
momentum profits. 
In addition, I examine the Shapiro-Wilk test (1965) that is usually employed for 
small sample sizes until 50. Having 51 observations, the Shapiro-Wilk test appears 
appropriate for my sample. The statistic W shows the evidence of normality where 
small values present non-normality. Using our data, the Shapiro-Wilk test W takes 
the value of 0.959 with a high p-value of 0.075. This indicates that using the 
Shapiro-Wilk test, I cannot reject the hypothesis that momentum profits are 
normally distributed. 
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Overall, the distribution of momentum profits tends to be normal. The histogram of 
momentum profits, the normal probability plot and most of normality tests show 
that the normal assumption cannot be rejected. These suggest that the selection of t- 
statistics to determine the statistical significance of abnormal returns is appropriate. 
Non-Parametric Tests 
Although momentum profits tend to follow the Gaussian distribution in most tests 
(beyond the Jarque-Bera statistic), as a robustness test, I also use non-parametric 
tests being aware that non-parametric tests are less powerful tools and the rejection 
rate is very low. I show the non-parametric tests only in key tables and I focus on 
them only when they indicate an opposite result to the parametric test findings. 
The parametric test used is the t-test for two independent samples and the equivalent 
non-parametric test is the Mann-Whitney U test. The Mann-Whitney U test converts 
the scores on the continuous variable to ranks and then, finds the average rank in 
each group and evaluates whether the ranks for two groups differ significantly. For 
a statistically significant difference between the two samples to exist, the probability 
value p should be less than 0.05. Similar to the parametric t-test, I found that the 
Mann-Whitney U test shows that there exists a statistically significant difference 
between the winner and loser portfolio returns with a p-value equal to 0.027. 
Median Parametric p-value Non-parametric p-value 
W-L 1.32% 0.026 0.027 
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I further used the parametric one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and the 
equivalent non-parametric test (Kruskal-Wallis test). The idea of the Kruskal-Wallis 
test is similar to Mann-Whitney U test where scores converted to ranks and the 
mean rank for each group is compared. The difference is that Mann-Whitney U test 
constructed to compare two groups and Kruskal-Wallis test constructed to compare 
more than two groups. Using the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test, the result 
concurs with that produced by the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). I 
document that Kruskal-Wallis test generates p=0.159 (p>0.05) and therefore, it does 
not exist statistically significant difference among the means of five portfolios. 
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Figure 5.8 
Histogram of Momentum Profits 
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Figure 5.9 
Normal Probability Plot 
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Table 5.4 
Descriptive Statistics 
Average 1.26% 
Median 1.32% 
Standard Deviation 0.016 
Minimum -3.29% 
Maximum 4.60% 
Skewness -0.36 
Kurtosis 1.29 
Jarque-Bera 7.42 
(p-value=0.024) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.113 
(p-value=0.101) 
Shapiro-Wilk 0.959 
(p-value=0.075) 
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Chapter 6 
MOMENTUM PROFITS IN ALTERNATIVE STOCK MARKET 
STRUCTURES 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines whether momentum profitability and different stock market 
trading systems (dealer, auction, floor and automated markets) are associated. To 
examine whether an association exists between stock market organisation and 
continuation profits, I examine the most significant changes have occurred to the 
structure of the London Stock Exchange in the past thirty years. 
On 27`x' October 1986, an important change in the London Stock Exchange's history 
occurred that was nicknamed the Big Bang'. In a single day, the LSE experienced 
substantial alterations to the structure of the market as well as to the nature and 
number of participants. A major change that coincided with deregulation was the 
introduction of an electronic screen-based trading system called Stock Exchange 
Automated Quotation System (SEAQ)2. The new SEAQ mechanism was an 
electronic system capable of handling between eight and nine transactions per 
Tonks and Webb (1991) and Thomas (1986,1989) present a comprehensive review of the 
deregulation process. 
2 The Big Bang was marked by additional significant changes. In the post-deregulation period, fixed 
commissions were eliminated and negotiated rates became available. Foreign firms allowed to 
become market makers, as well as member firms, had permission to act in a dual capacity whereby 
they were able not only to quote prices of securities (as jobbers) but also to act as agents (as brokers). 
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second as well as disseminating information widely and rapidly throughout the 
investor community with the Teletext Output Price Information Computer (TOPIC) 
network. All participants in the market could be informed through the TOPIC 
screens of securities information such as competing quotes, trading volumes, 
previous day's closing prices, and time of last trades. Hence, the adoption of recent 
technological advances in computing and telecommunications allowed face-to-face 
trading on the floor of the exchange to be replaced by telephone and electronic 
trading on the screen system. This study investigates the momentum profits 
generated before and after Big Bang. Chapter 5 reported that momentum profits 
vary accross different periods and therefore, I would expect continuation gains to be 
different before and after Big Bang. 
A decade after the shift from the floor-based trading system to an electronic trading 
system, the UK stock market moved away from being a pure dealership market 
where market makers are the counter party in all transactions by quoting the bid 
(buy) and ask (sell) prices at which they will transact in securities. With the 
introduction of the Stock Exchange Electronic Trading System (SETS) on 20th 
October 1997, all FTSE100 stocks, and later since March 1998 some additional 
companies from the FTSE250 index, have been traded in an auction system where 
investors trade directly with each other without a market maker's intervention 
placing orders on a limit order book. Initially, only around 30 per cent of orders 
went through the SETS in relation to the dealership system. The LSE made some 
improvements to the new system to boost the percentage of transactions that used 
the auction system. For example, it abolished the minimum £4,000 order to boost 
the trading volume of small investors' transactions. Gradually, more and more 
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transactions have been executed under the auction rather than the dealer mechanism. 
The average orders executed through the limit order book were 45.6 per cent in 
1998,49.9 per cent in 1999,52.0 per cent in 2000 and 58.7 per cent in 2001 (Stock 
Exchange, 2002). This study examines the momentum gains demonstrated on shares 
traded on the SETS auction mechanism and on shares operated with the SEAQ 
dealer system. 
The motivation to examine whether there exists a relationship between momentum 
profits and stock market structures is based on the fact that trading mechanisms 
influence market characteristics to which the momentum effect is linked. First, both 
momentum profits and market organisation appear to be associated with trading 
volume. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) show that securities with high trading 
volumes display greater momentum profitability than their low trading volume 
counterparts. In addition, Naidu and Rozeff (1994) and the Stock Exchange find that 
the Singapore Stock Exchange and the LSE respectively experienced rapid increases 
in trading volume in the post-automation period. Therefore, one would expect that 
automated markets, since they experience high trading volume, exhibit larger degree 
of momentum gains than floor markets. 
Second, both momentum payoffs and market mechanisms tend to be associated with 
informational efficiency. Hong and Stein (1999) suggest that continuation gains 
come from the gradual expansion of information among investors while Chelley- 
Steeley (2003) demonstrates that the same shares adjust to their fundamental news 
more quickly when they trade on the Paris Bourse auction market than when they 
trade on the SEAQ International dealer system. Thus, according to Hong and Stein's 
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(1999) behavioural model, one would expect that auction markets, in which share 
prices adjust more quickly to news, would generate lower continuation profits than 
dealer markets. 
Beyond the fact that trading mechanisms influence market characteristics to which 
the momentum effect is associated, alternative trading structures have been found to 
exert an important influence over the behaviour of equity returns. For example, 
trading systems influence the execution costs for investors. Auction mechanisms 
tend to generate lower execution costs for investors than dealer systems. Barclay et 
al. (1999), employing Nasdaq data, and Naik and Yadav (1999), studying LSE 
information, find that when both stock markets adopted auction market procedures 
in the post-1997 period, execution costs were reduced. In addition, automated 
systems involve higher transaction costs for investors than floor structures. 
Venkatamaran (2001) documents that shares from the Paris Bourse automated 
market are associated with higher execution costs than comparable shares on the 
NYSE floor system. 
Different trading systems influence share return volatility. Auction mechanisms 
appear to generate higher return volatility than dealer trading systems. Chelley- 
Steeley (2002) shows that both the opening and closing returns of FTSE100 shares 
experienced a significant increase in volatility since the introduction of the SETS 
mechanism. Chelley-Steeley (2003) reports that cross-listed stocks display higher 
volatility when they trade on the Paris Bourse auction market rather than when they 
trade on the SEAQ International dealer market. Automated markets further tend to 
generate larger volatility than their counterparts that use floor systems. Naidu and 
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Rozeff (1994), studying the Singapore Stock Exchange, and Tonks and Webb 
(1991), studying the LSE, document a substantial increase of volatility in the post- 
automation period. 
Trading systems have also an impact on institutional/small investors' preferences. 
Auction mechanisms favour retail investors, while dealer systems seem to attract 
institutional traders. De Jong et al. (1995) compare French shares listed both on the 
Paris Bourse and the SEAQ International. They find that the Paris Bourse auction 
market provides lower execution costs for small investors, but the SEAQ 
International dealer market offers better liquidity for large traders because market 
makers have to deal with large orders. Institutions seem also to prefer floor to 
automated systems. Large investors can better identify the traders who have inside 
information and thus, on the floor of a stock market, they can observe their 
investment strategies. 
Auction mechanisms are also more transparent than dealer structures. Order-driven 
systems provide greater pre-trade transparency. In auction mechanisms, investors 
can get information from the limit order book on the particular price an order could 
execute. However, in dealer structures, only limited information is available. Apart 
from better transparency before a trade occurs, order-driven systems offer greater 
post-trade transparency. In auction systems, the real-time publication of trades is 
enforced, whereas in dealer structures, delays in publication may occur for large 
trades. This happens because market makers need time to unwind large transactions 
(Gemmill, 1996; and Board and Sutcliffe, 2000). 
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To sum up, given the influence that stock market structures can have over share 
returns, this study investigates whether alternative market structures can influence 
momentum profitability. I investigate momentum profits generated before and after 
Big Bang (floor vs automated mechanisms) and on shares traded on the SETS 
auction system and on the SEAQ dealer mechanism. The next section documents 
the empirical findings, and the final section presents conclusions. 
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6.2 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The empirical results in this chapter are divided into two main sections. First, I find 
that momentum profits are larger after Big Bang. I examine whether this finding 
persists when I use the accounting sub-sample and when I control for risk, size, and 
book-to-market. Second, I document that momentum gains are larger for shares 
traded on the SETS auction market. 
6.2.1 Momentum Profits in Floor and Automated Systems 
6.2.1.1 Initial Findings 
On 27 `h October 1986 an electronic screen-based trading system called 
SEAQ was introduced. With the adoption of technological advances, a shift 
from the floor-based trading system to an electronic trading system 
occurred. This section investigates whether momentum profits are 
economically different before and after Big Bang. This chapter generates 
winner and loser portfolios choosing a different span of months in 
comparison with Chapter 4 because of the month that the Big Bang 
occurred. 
Pre-Big Bang Post-Big Bang 
Rank periods Test periods Rank periods Test periods 
Oct 1975-Mar 1976 May 1976-Oct 1976 Oct 1986-Mar 1987 May 1987-Oct 87 
Oct 1985-Mar 1986 May 1986-Oct 1986 Oct 2000-Mar 2001 May 2001-Oct 01 
The analysis of the automated system commences in October 1986, rather 
than November 1986, to keep the form of ranking and test periods in both 
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structures. This is important since Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2000) report 
that momentum profits demonstrate seasonality. 
This chapter defines shares with the best (winners) and worst (losers) 
performances using alternative definitions. Using three portfolios, past 
winners (W) and losers (L) each comprise 30 per cent of the sample. 
Constructing ten portfolios, winners and losers include the top and bottom 
10 per cent of shares and generating five portfolios, winners and losers 
include the top and bottom 20 per cent of the sample. The present study 
controls for potential different momentum profitability generated before and 
after Big Bang because of the definition of the winner and loser portfolios. 
Initially, Table 6.1 shows that momentum profits are economically and 
statistically significant on the LSE using three alternative percentages to 
define the winner and loser shares and using a different span of months in 
comparison with the previous Chapter. Past winners (W) outperform prior 
losers (L) over the test period by 0.96 per cent using three portfolios (Panel 
A), 1.18 per cent employing five portfolios (Panel B) and 1.53 per cent per 
month using ten portfolios (Panel C). As expected, more extreme winners 
and losers generate higher continuation profits. Interestingly, returns on the 
intermediate portfolios also reflect their prior ranking using all alternative 
definitions of winners and losers. Portfolios that achieved high (low) past 
performances tended to generate high (low) returns in the following period. 
This shows that the momentum effect is not only restricted to the extreme 
winners and losers. 
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Table 6.1 shows portfolio returns before and after Big Bang. Pre-Big Bang, 
monthly momentum profits are 0.41 per cent using three portfolios, 0.50 per 
cent employing five portfolios and 0.73 per cent using ten portfolios. These 
returns stem from the winner portfolio. Post-Big Bang, monthly continuation 
payoffs are 1.38 per cent when three portfolios are used, 1.69 per cent when 
five portfolios are employed and 2.14 per cent when ten portfolios are 
examined. These profits are mainly driven by the loser portfolio. 
Therefore, shares traded during the automated sub-period generate 
significantly larger momentum returns than shares operated on the floor sub- 
period. Past winners outperform prior losers in 75 per cent and 92 per cent 
of test periods before and after Big Bang respectively. The difference in 
monthly momentum profits between shares traded in the automated period 
and their counterpart shares traded during the floor period is 0.97 (t- 
stat=2.42) per cent using three portfolios, 1.19 (t-stat=2.50) per cent using 
five portfolios and 1.41 (t-stat=2.38) per cent using ten portfolios. Figure 6.1 
plots the continuation gains generated on the LSE and shows that most of 
the superior momentum profits during the automated sub-period arise during 
the years 1990-1993. The interruption of the lines in 1987 happens because 
we miss one test period at the time of the Big Bang 
I also employ a non-parametric test to investigate the statistical significance 
of returns. Using the Mann-Whitney U test to compare the means of the W, 
L portfolios for the 10 portfolios, I find that the p-value is 0.003 (p<0.05) 
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using the entire period, 0.346 (p>0.05) using the floor period and 0.004 
(p<0.05) for the automated period. Then, I find that the p-value is 0.036 
when I compare floor and automated momentum returns. These suggest, as 
expected, that when using a non-parametric test the findings concur with 
those generated using a parametric test. Momentum profits are more 
pronounced in the automated period and the difference in momentum profits 
before and after Big Bang is statistically significant. 
Median Parametric p-value Non-parametric p-value 
Floor Automated Floor Automated Floor Automated 
W-L 0.46% 1.13% 0.36 0.014 0.52 0.015 
(3 portfolios) 
W-L 0.51% 1.34% 0.29 0.008 0.47 0.006 
(5 portfolios) 
W-L 0.65% 1.74% 0.17 0.004 0.35 0.004 
(10 portfolios) 
The finding that momentum profits are not persistent during different time 
periods on the LSE concurs with the results of Hon and Tonks (2003). They 
document that momentum strategies were profitable between 1955 and 
1996, but that they did not offer profits between 1955 and 1976. However, 
Liu et al. (1999) report that momentum profitability remained approximately 
at the same level between 1977-1987 and 1988-1998. Continuation profits 
were 15.1 per cent per year from 1977 to 1987 and slightly higher 17.4 per 
cent per year from 1988 to 1998. Notice that Liu et al. and this study 
investigate similar sub-periods, without generating identical results. This 
divergence could be explained because Liu et al. examine share returns from 
Datastream, but this study investigates share returns from LSPD. Datastream 
returns are calculated using mid share prices, while LSPD returns are 
computed employing last traded share prices. 
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Table 6.1 
Momentum Profits in Floor and Automated Systems 
Entire Period (1975-2001) Floor Period (1975-1986) Automated Period (1987-2001) 
Panel A: 3 Portfolios 
L 0.17% 1.40% -0.74% 
0.54 3.96 -1.63 
2 0.99% 1.79% 0.41% 
5.57 7.52 1.66 
W 1.13% 1.80% 0.64% 
5.51 6.73 2.16 
W-L 0.96% 0.41% 1.38% 
2.58 0.92 2.55 
Panel B: 5 Portfolios 
L -0.01% 1.32% -1.00% 
-0.04 3.46 -1.96 
2 0.70% 1.62% 0.03% 
3.21 5.81 0.09 
3 1.01% 1.84% 0.41% 
5.54 7.95 1.56 
4 1.07% 1.78% 0.56% 
6.13 6.97 2.36 
W 1.17% 1.82% 0.69% 
5.27 6.77 2.08 
W-L 1.18% 0.50% 1.69% 
2.86 1.07 2.78 
Panel C: 10 Portfolios 
L -0.34% 1.15% -1.44% 
-0.82 2.63 -2.39 
2 0.31% 1.49% -0.55% 
1.05 4.28 -1.30 
3 0.54% 1.56% -0.21% 
2.15 5.00 -0.60 
4 0.86% 1.68% 0.26% 
4.47 6.57 0.97 
5 1.01% 1.88% 0.37% 
5.53 8.23 1.44 
6 1.00% 1.79% 0.43% 
5.34 7.44 1.58 
7 1.08% 1.78% 0.57% 
6.42 7.14 2.53 
8 1.07% 1.77% 0.56% 
5.76 6.54 2.21 
9 1.14% 1.76% 0.69% 
5.42 6.53 2.22 
W 1.19% 1.87% 0.70% 
4.94 6.74 1.89 
W-L 1.53% 0.73% 2.14% 
3.23 1.40 3.02 
This table shows the momentum profits using the full period and the automated and floor sub- 
periods. In the breakdown of three portfolios, we define 30 per cent of the full sample as the loser 
(L), 30 per cent as the winner (W) and 40 per cent as the intermediate portfolio. In the divisions of 
five and ten portfolios, each portfolio is classified with 20 and 10 per cent of the full sample 
respectively. 
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6.2.1.2 Controlling for Size and Book-to-Market 
A large number of studies have shown the influence that size and book-to- 
market can have on share returns (e. g., Banz, 1981; Fama and French, 1992). 
Zarowin (1990) reports that when he matches winners and losers of the same 
size, the long-term overreaction profits disappear. Before and after the Big 
Bang, shares display significantly different market values and book-to- 
market ratios. This section investigates whether momentum profits remain 
stronger in the post-Big Bang period, after controlling for size and book-to- 
market. 
To test this assertion, matched portfolios are created similar to the approach 
adopted in Daniel and Titman (1997). I select this methodology because 
Nagel (2001) using UK and US data, reports that the reversal pattern that 
momentum profits demonstrate in long-term periods largely disappears after 
following this methodology. I generate nine size-book-to-market sorted 
portfolios; securities are sorted into three groups based on their market 
capitalisation, and shares in each size-sorted group are further divided into 
three additional groups based on their book-to-market. I calculate the returns 
of these nine size-book-to-market portfolios over the test period. 
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Full sample 
Small si; 7e stocks Medium size stocks Large size stocks 
(.... The same division over all portfolios) 
Low B/M shares Medium B/M shares High B/M shares 
The performance of each security in the test period is calculated as: 
Ric" _Rit _RCH (6.1) 
where R, cH is the characteristic-adjusted return on security i in month t, R;, 
is the return on security i in month t, and RcH is the return on a size-book- 
to-market matched portfolio in month t. 
Panel A of Table 6.2 shows the unadjusted returns using the accounting sub- 
sample, which examines over 2000 shares with additional accounting data. I 
report that the accounting sub-sample demonstrates identical results to the 
full sample. This suggests that the finding that momentum profits are strong 
using UK data driven by the post-1987 period holds using a different data 
set. 
Using the accounting sub-sample, accounting information for each portfolio 
can be observed. As expected, shares in the automated structure exhibit 
significantly higher market capitalisation and lower book-to-market ratios 
because of the continuing bull markets. Overall, size and book-to-market 
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cannot explain the momentum 'profits on the LSE and the different 
momentum profits generated post- and pre- Big Bang. The winner portfolio 
includes higher market value shares than the loser portfolio when the entire 
period and both sub-periods are studied. The arbitrage portfolio in the post- 
Big Bang period even includes larger capitalisation companies than its 
counterpart arbitrage portfolio in the pre-Big Bang period. Hence, when size 
differences are considered, momentum profits in the post-Big Bang period 
should have been even greater. 
Panel B of Table 6.2 shows the size and book-to-market adjusted portfolio 
returns. I find that after controlling for size and book-to-market ratios, 
momentum profits decrease significantly, especially when the automated 
system was in operation. Nevertheless, continuation profits are economically 
significant using the entire period and abnormal returns are still much higher 
in the post-Big Bang period. Stated differently, the difference in momentum 
profits between the floor and automated periods cannot be attributed to the 
characteristics of firms. The difference in momentum profitability between 
the two sub-periods remains significant, although smaller than that obtained 
from unadjusted returns. This finding suggests that size and book-to-market 
cannot explain the difference in momentum gains generated before and after 
Big Bang. 
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Table 6.2 
Size and Book-to-Market Adjustment 
Entire Period Floor Period Automated Period 
Panel A: Unadjusted Returns 
L 0.08% 1.40% -0.87% 
0.24 3.29 -1.93 
W 1.27% 2.06% 0.71% 
6.14 7.32 2.44 
W-L 1.19% 0.66% 1.58% 
3.05 1.29 2.94 
L size 232.40 55.76 395.96 
B/M 1.86 2.58 1.18 
W size 501.36 70.87 870.36 
B/M 0.98 1.45 0.59 
W-L size 268.96 14.45 504.62 
B/M -0.87 -1.17 -0.60 
Panel B: Size and Book-to-Market Adjusted Returns 
L -0.40% -0.20% -0.54% 
-1.35 -0.33 -2.21 
W 0.39% 0.24% 0.49% 
1.20 0.42 1.43 
W-L 0.79% 0.45% 1.03% 
1.80 0.53 2.45 
This table demonstrates the momentum profitability generated in the full period, the 
automated and the floor sub-periods using the accounting sub-sample (Panel A) as well as 
the momentum profits that remain after adjusting for size and book-to-market (Panel B). We 
generate nine size-book-to-market sorted portfolios; securities are sorted into three groups 
based on their market capitalisation, and shares in each size-sorted group are further divided 
into three additional groups based on their book-to-market. I calculate the returns of these 
nine size-book-to-market portfolios over the test period. The performance of each security 
in the test period is calculated as: RrCH = Rj1 - RICH, where RECH is the characteristic- 
adjusted return on security i in month t, R; t is the return on security i in month t, and 
R, " is the return on a size-book-to-market matched portfolio in month t. 
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6.2.1.3 Risk adjustments 
Academics tend to investigate whether an investment strategy provides 
abnormal profits after controlling for risk, since profits on occasion 
disappear considering the risk. For example, Fama and French (1996) find 
that risk changes can explain the long-term reversal profitability. This 
section examines the momentum profits achieved in both floor and 
automated structures after controlling for risk. 
Initially, this study controls for risk using the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; and Black, 1972). I calculate the aggregate 
coefficient betas (e. g., Dimson, 1979) to overtake the problem of infrequent 
trading that conventional betas demonstrate (e. g., Scholes and Williams, 
1977). Using portfolio returns over the rank period, I estimate the multiple 
regression of portfolio returns against lagging, matching and leading market 
returns. I select the number of leads and lags that are statistically significant. 
R 
Rp, r -Rf,, =ap + 
Zßp(R, 
R, kr -Rf, k, r)+er, 
(6.2) 
k--n 
where Rp. t 
is the return of portfolio p in month t, R f,, is the one-month 
Treasury Bill rate in month t, and Rm,, is the return of the proxy market 
(FTSE All-Share) in month t. The aggregate coefficient beta is the sum of 
betas with different leads and lags. 
Table 6.3 shows the portfolios' aggregate betas. Results show that 
momentum profits cannot be explained by risk using the entire period. The 
winner portfolio demonstrates lower aggregate beta than its counterpart loser 
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portfolio. Further, the difference in momentum profitability between the two 
structures cannot be attributed to systematic risk. Portfolios in the automated 
period tend to display higher betas, but the beta of the arbitrage portfolio 
(ßw_L) is -0.22 for the automated period and 0.31 for the floor period. 
Stated differently, the arbitrage portfolio generates higher performance and 
experiences lower risk using the automated period. After considering for risk 
differences, momentum profits in the post-Big Bang period should have 
been even larger than the data reveal. 
I extend the investigation and calculate the aggregate betas of the arbitrage 
portfolio examining alternative lags and leads. Table 6.4 shows that when 
applying until three lags and three leads, the beta of the arbitrage portfolio is 
always positive during the floor sub-period and negative during the 
automated sub-period. For example, employing two lags and two leads, the 
beta of the arbitrage portfolio is -0.19 for the automated sub-period, but 0.40 
for the floor sub-period. These results indicate that the CAPM cannot 
explain the difference in momentum gains demonstrated before and after Big 
Bang. 
I undertake further investigation and define risk using an alternative model. 
In the literature, there has been a debate over the misspecification of risk. 
The CAPM has been subject severe criticism when recent data has been used 
(e. g., Strong and Xu, 1997), so other models have been developed to 
determine the risk-return relationship. Perhaps one of the most recent and 
well recognised models is the three-factor model by Fama and French (1993) 
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that defines the risk as a function of beta, size and book-to-market. Liu et al. 
(1999) use UK data and report that after controlling for the three-factor 
model, momentum profits are lower than when the CAPM is applied. This 
suggests that the three-factor model captures the momentum gains better 
than the CAPM. Until now I have controlled for beta, size and book-to- 
market separately and find that they cannot capture the difference in 
momentum profits in alternative structures. Now I investigate whether this 
finding persists when I control for these factors simultaneously. 
To control for the three-factor model, I estimate the following regression: 
RP,, -Rf,, = a,, +/,, (R, ,, -Rf,, 
)+s, SMB, +h, HML, +e4,, (6.3) 
where R,, is the return of portfolio pin month t, Rfj is the one-month 
Treasury Bill rate in month t, and Rm,, is the return of the proxy market 
(FTSE All-Share) in month t. I generate nine portfolios; shares are sorted 
into three groups based on the market value and then, each size-sorted 
portfolio divided further into three portfolios based on the book-to-market. 
SMBB (Small Minus Big) shows the portfolio that buys the three small size 
portfolios and sells short the three big size portfolios. HML1 (High Minus 
Low) shows the portfolio that buys the three high book-to-market portfolios 
and sells short the three low book-to-market portfolios. 
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Full sample 
Small si, 7e stocks (A) Medium size stocks (B) Large size stocks (C) 
(.... The same division over all portfolios) 
Low B/M shares (a) Medium B/M shares (b) High B/M shares (c) 
SMB, F+ Aa, Ab, Ac 
- Ca, Cb, Cc 
HML, + Ac, Bc, Cc 
- Aa, Ba, Ca 
Table 6.5 shows the sensitivities and the constant of the model for the loser 
portfolio (Panel A), the winner portfolio (Panel B) and the arbitrage 
portfolio (Panel Q. The alpha of the model demonstrates the abnormal 
profits that remained after considering for the three factors. Where market 
efficiency holds, alpha should be equal to zero. Findings show that the three- 
factor model cannot explain either the momentum profits generated on the 
LSE, or the stronger momentum profitability displayed in the automated 
sub-period. Continuation payoffs remain at 1.64 (t-statistic=4.45) per cent 
per month during the period of automation, but lower at 0.80 (2.49) per cent 
per month during the floor period. Interestingly, consistent with Liu et al. 
(1999) using UK data and Fama and French (1996) using US data, this study 
finds that the three-factor model cannot explain the momentum effect. The 
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arbitrage portfolios display negative 'sensitivities in all three Fama and 
3 French factors. 
Overall, after examining the risk-adjusted momentum profitability before 
and after Big Bang, continuation profits still tend to remain stronger on the 
automated sub-period. Using the CAPM to define risk, I found that the 
arbitrage portfolio on the post-Big Bang period generates higher abnormal 
returns experiencing lower risk. Employing the three-factor model, I 
reported that this alternative definition cannot capture the momentum profits 
on the LSE and momentum profits remain stronger on the automated period. 
3I investigated whether the assumptions of multiple regression are fulfilled. However for space 
reasons, I do not present the results either in this chapter or in the following chapters. For example, I 
examined whether there exists a multicollinearity problem where independent variables are strongly 
associated. Therefore, after considering that there exists some association between independent 
variables with the dependent variable, I observed the tolerance magnitude where high tolerance 
implies no violation of the multicollinearity assumption. Further, I examined whether residuals are 
normally distributed by generating the normal probability plot (when residuals are normal, points lie 
in a reasonably straight line) and calculating other goodness-of-fit tests (e. g., Kolmogorov-Smirnov). 
I further examined the scatter plot of residuals to identify potential outliers, to observe whether 
points are reasonably distributed above and below the line and to examine whether residuals have 
approximately constant variance. 
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Table 6.3 
Portfolio Aggregate Betas 
Entire period Floor Period Automated Period 
L 1.51 0.91 1.81 
2 1.17 0.85 1.37 
3 1.14 0.92 1.29 
4 1.10 0.93 1.22 
5 1.08 0.91 1.19 
6 1.08 0.98 1.14 
7 1.12 1.04 1.17 
8 1.09 0.93 1.21 
9 1.18 1.03 1.29 
W 1.42 1.22 1.59 
W-L -0.09 0.31 -0.22 
This table shows the aggregate betas of the ten past return portfolios. We calculate the 
portfolio aggregate coefficient betas (e. g., Dimson, 1979), by running the multiple 
regression of portfolio returns against lagging, matching and leading market returns: 
n 
Re,, - Rf, r = ap 
+ Pp (Rm, k, t - 
Rf, 
k, r) + e,, r 
k--n 
where Rp, t 
is the return of portfolio p in month t, R ft is the one-month Treasury Bill 
rate in month t, and Rm,, is the return of the proxy market (FTSE All-Share) in month 1. 
We choose the number of leads and lags, for each of the ten past return portfolios, that are 
statistically significant. The aggregate coefficient beta is the sum of betas with different 
leads and lags. 
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Table 6.4 
Aggregate Betas of the Arbitrage Portfolio 
-1 -2 -3 
+1 F 0.26 F 0.44 F 0.51 
A -0.34 A -0.24 A -0.21 
+2 F 0.22 F 0.40 F 0.47 
A -0.29 A -0.19 A -0.15 
+3 F 0.22 F 0.40 F 0.48 
A -0.32 A -0.21 A -0.17 
This table demonstrates the aggregate betas that the arbitrage portfolio (W-L) displays into 
alternative leads and lags. F and A represent the floor and automated sub-periods 
respectively. 
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Table 6.5 
Controlling for Risk with the Three-Factor Model 
Entire period Floor period Automated period 
Panel A: Losers 
a P 
-1.26% 
(-4.50) 
1.51% 
(1.78) 
-1.08% 
(-2.63) 
p 1.28 
(17.92) 
1.20 
(15.21) 
1.37 
(12.68) 
S p 
0.87 
(9.01) 
1.07 
(8.98) 
0.69 
(5.25) 
h 
P 
-0.18 
(-1,97) 
0.09 
(0.82) 
-0.23 
(-1.91) 
adj -RZ 0.52 
0.70 0.48 
Panel B: Winners 
a p 
0.00% 
(0.00) 
2.30% 
(2.77) 
0.56% 
(1.04) 
ýp 0.98 
(17.09) 
1.04 
(16.92) 
0.91 
(10.31) 
S P 
0.59 
(7.63) 
0.69 
(7.52) 
0.52 
(4.76) 
h 
P 
-0.35 
(-4.90) 
-0.06 
(-0.64) 
-0.45 
(-4.57) 
adj -RZ 0.51 
0.76 0.41 
Panel C: Winners-Losers 
a 
1.26% 0.80% 1.64% 
p (4.99) (2.49) (4.45) 
-0.30 -0.16 -0.46 
p (-4.71) (-1.77) (-4.96) 
-0.28 -0.37 -0.18 S p (-3.23) (-2.67) (-1.58) 
h -0.17 -0.15 -0.22 
P (-2.15) (-1.12) (-2.16) 
adj -R2 0.09 
0.06 0.14 
This table shows the robustness of Table 5.1 after adjusting for the three-factor model that 
controls for beta, size and book-to-m arket. We run the following regression: 
RP,, -Rf,, =ap+ ßp (R,,,, -Rf,, ) + s, SMB, + h, HMLL + ep,, 
where Rp, t 
is the return of portfolio p in month t, Rf, is the one-month Treasury Bill 
rate in month t, and R.,, is the return of the proxy market (FTSE All-Share) in month t. 
SMB (Small minus Big) and HML (High minus Low) are the Fama and French small firm 
and book-to-market factors respectively, and to generate them, nine portfolios are formed 
by sorting first by size: low-, medium- and large-size portfolios and then by book-to- 
market: low-, medium- and high-book-to-market portfolios. 
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6.2.1.4 Employing a Different Dataset 
During the periods when floor and automated systems operated, shares with 
different characteristics have been traded. Until now I have controlled for 
size, book-to-market and beta. This section undertakes another robustness 
test and investigates the momentum profitability that the same shares 
generate in both structures. Stated differently, I select stocks with return 
information for the duration of the whole sample period. I find that only 266 
shares fulfil that condition. Then, I compare the momentum profitability 
achieved by these stocks in the automated and floor sub-periods. 
Table 6.6 and Figure 6.2 demonstrate that the automated sub-period provides 
higher monthly momentum profits than the floor sub-period. This indicates 
that the superior momentum gains in the post-Big Bang period hold when a 
different data set is employed. Interestingly, beyond the full sample of over 
6000 stocks and the accounting sub-sample of over 2000 companies, 
momentum profits remain economically significant even using this sub- 
sample of only 266 companies. Nevertheless, momentum profits are 
significantly lower than in the case of the full sample and the accounting 
sub-sample. This may be explained by the fact that shares that have return 
information for the whole 1975-2001 period, are high capitalisation equities. 
Consistent with Hong et al. (2000), there exists a negative relationship 
between size and momentum profitability, and therefore, this sample that 
includes high capitalisation shares would expect to generate relatively low 
momentum profits. 
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Using this small number of shares, I further examine whether momentum 
profits are stronger in the post-Big Bang period after considering bull and 
bear markets and once the three-factor model controls for risk. Overall, I 
find that the same results; momentum gains are most pronounced in the post- 
1987 period. Due to space considerations, I do not present the equivalent 
tables. 
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Table 6.6 
Using a Different Data Set 
Entire Period Floor Period Automated Period 
Panel A: 3 Portfolios 
L 0.88% 1.81% 0.21% 
4.24 7.04 0.70 
W 1.34% 1.95% 0.89% 
9.40 11.23 4.23 
W-L 0.46% 0.14% 0.69% 
1.81 0.44 1.90 
Panel B: 5 Portfolios 
L 0.83% 1.87% 0.07% 
3.35 6.10 0.21 
W 1.39% 2.04% 0.92% 
9.18 11.50 4.05 
W-L 0.56% 0.17% 0.85% 
1.94 0.48 2.04 
Panel C: 10 Portfolios 
L 0.58% 1.81% -0.30% 
1.81 4.43 -0.67 
W 1.47% 2.16% 0.97% 
7.67 9.40 3.40 
W-L 0.89% 0.35% 1.28% 
2.36 0.74 2.39 
This table investigates whether our previous results persist using a different data set. Using only 266 
shares, with return information for the whole duration of our sample (1975-2001), I compare the 
momentum profitability that is demonstrated for the same stocks in the entire period and in the 
automated and floor sub-periods. 
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6.2.2 Momentum Profits in Dealer and Auction Systems 
A decade after the shift from the floor-based trading system to an electronic trading 
system, the UK stock market moved away from being a purely dealership market. 
With the introduction of the Stock Exchange Electronic Trading System (SETS) on 
20th October 1997, all FTSE 100 stocks, and later some additional large companies' 
shares from the FTSE250, have been traded in an auction system. This study 
compares the momentum profitability demonstrated by stocks traded on the SETS 
mechanism and on the SEAQ dealer system. 
Dealer market Auction market 
Rank periods Test periods Rank periods Test periods 
Oct 1975-Mar 1976 May 1976-Oct 1976 Oct 1997-Mar 1998 May 1998-Oct 98 
Oct 2000-Mar-2001 May 2001-Oct 2001 Oct2000-Mar 2001 May 2001-Oct 01 
Table 6.7 reports that the magnitude of continuation profits is different when 
comparing quote-driven and order-driven mechanisms. Column 1 of Table 6.7 
shows the momentum profits generated by shares traded with the SETS mechanism 
and Column 2 of Table 6.7 demonstrates the profits displayed by shares traded with 
the dealer system. I find that monthly momentum profits for shares traded with the 
SETS mechanism are 1.20 per cent using three portfolios (Panel A), 2.01 per cent 
using five portfolios (Panel B) and 2.94 per cent using ten portfolios (Panel Q. 
These abnormal returns are driven by the loser portfolio and are significantly higher 
than those reported by shares traded with the dealer system from 1975 to 2001. 
Considering that auction mechanisms tend to generate lower execution costs than 
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dealer systems (e. g., Huang and Stoll, 1996), the difference in the profitability of 
momentum profits generated by the two mechanisms is even greater than the current 
data show. 
One could argue that I compare the momentum profits that two mechanisms enjoy 
over different periods. Hence, I extend the investigation and examine the 
momentum profits gained by companies traded with the SETS auction system and 
the SEAQ dealer mechanism for the same period: from October 1997 to October 
2001. Column 3 of Table 6.7 shows the returns achieved by companies traded with 
the SEAQ dealer system from October 1997 to October 2001. When I compare the 
magnitude of momentum profits that columns 1 and 3 display, I find that stocks 
operated with the SETS system generate almost identical momentum profits to 
shares traded on the SEAQ. 
Nevertheless, until now I have not considered the large size of the companies traded 
with the SETS mechanism. Consistent with Hong et al. (2000), there exists a 
negative relationship between size and momentum profitability and therefore, shares 
operated on the SETS, which are the largest capitalisation shares on the LSE, would 
expect to generate low momentum profits. Given the influence that market value 
can have over momentum returns, I investigate the momentum profits achieved by 
companies traded on the SETS and SEAQ after taking account of size differences. 
To adjust for size, I calculate the momentum profitability of the 150 largest 
capitalisation shares that have been traded on the SEAQ dealer system. Column 4 of 
Table 6.7 reports the returns of these 150 shares. When I compare the findings of 
Columns 1,3 and 4,1 find that the largest 150 shares operated on the SEAQ 
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mechanism generate significantly lower continuation profits than their counterpart 
companies traded on the SETS and the full sample of shares operated on SEAQ. 
This suggests that after allowing for size differences between the SETS and SEAQ 
samples, shares operated on the SETS system demonstrate significantly larger 
momentum returns than their counterpart companies traded on SEAQ. 
I extend the investigation and undertake another robustness test. I calculate the 
continuation profits generated by the stocks on the SETS in the previous four years 
(1994-1997) when they were traded on the SEAQ system (Column 5 of Table 6.7). 
Column 6 of Table 6.7 shows the continuation profits demonstrated using the full 
sample from 1994 to 1997. Columns 1,5 and 6 show that the SETS stocks generate 
significantly lower returns when they were traded on the dealer system between 
1994 and 1997, while the full sample demonstrates strong profits. 
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6.3 CONCLUSION 
This study introduced a factor that influences the momentum profits and has not 
been previously identified. I investigated whether the market organisation (e. g., 
automated, floor, dealer and auction systems) has an impact on the magnitude of 
continuation returns. The motivation for examining such an association was based 
on the influence that stock market structures can have over share returns. I used UK 
data and studied some of the most significant changes that occurred to the structure 
of the London Stock Exchange. 
First, I considered the Big Bang, which occurred on 27`h October 1986 and resulted 
in the introduction of the automated SEAQ system and the shift of the LSE from a 
floor-based market to an automated market. I calculated the momentum profits 
generated before and after Big Bang. Findings indicated that shares traded in an 
automated,, structure generate much higher continuation profits than equities 
transacted on a floor-based system. These results persisted after controlling for size, 
book-to-market, risk and market conditions. Findings confirm the results of Hon 
and Tonks (2003) who demonstrate that momentum strategies can not earn profits in 
a sub-period from 1955 to 1976, but they contradict the findings of Liu et al. (1999) 
who suggest approximately the same momentum profitability between 1977-1987 
and 1988-1998. There is a difference between Liu et al. and this investigation, since 
they examine stock returns from Datastream and this study investigates share 
returns from the LSPD. 
Second, I considered the introduction of the SETS auction mechanism, which 
occurred on 20`h October 1997 and had as a result the shift of the LSE from the pure 
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dealership market. All FTSE 100 stocks, and later some additional large companies 
from the FTSE250, have now traded on the SETS auction system. Results showed 
that shares traded on the SETS order-driven system tended to demonstrate larger 
continuation profits than shares traded on the SEAQ quote-driven system. The 
difference in momentum profits between the two structures increased significantly 
after considering size differences. Companies traded on SETS are the largest 
capitalisation shares and consistent with Hong et al. (2000), they would be expected 
to earn lower rather than higher momentum returns. 
Beyond the finding that momentum profits vary under alternative market structures, 
other interesting results are reported. I found that momentum profits are significant 
when I use all listed companies on the LSE (over 6000 shares), a sub-sample of 
2000 shares with additional accounting information and a small number of 266 
stocks with complete return information from 1975 to 2001. I further documented 
that momentum profits persist after controlling for size, book-to-market and risk as 
defined by the CAPM and the three-factor model. These findings suggested that the 
momentum effect persists on the LSE using various data sets and after controlling 
for various factors that influence share returns. 
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Chapter 7 
VOLATILITY AND MOMENTUM PROFITABILITY 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates the role of volatility in influencing momentum profits. 
Shares with high volatility display wide spread out returns and therefore, potential 
higher magnitude momentum profitability. Chapter 6 indicated that shares traded on 
the post-Big Bang automated system generated larger continuation payoffs than 
shares which transacted on the pre-Big Bang floor mechanism as well as equities 
traded on the SETS auction system demonstrate stronger momentum gains that 
companies traded on the SEAQ dealer system. Given that shares displayed higher 
volatility traded on the post-Big Bang period (Tonks and Webb, 1991) and on the 
SETS system (Chelley-Steeley, 2003), this chapter examines whether the different 
levels of momentum profitability achieved in alternative stock market structures 
arises from volatility. 
This chapter also examines whether there exists an association between volatility, 
trading volume and the magnitude of continuation profits. Lee and Swaminathan 
(2000) show that securities with high trading volumes display greater momentum 
profitability than their low trading volume counterparts. Karpoff (1987), surveying 
the volatility-trading volume relationship, shows that the positive interrelationship 
between the two issues remains persistent in studies employing different periods, 
data-sets and time intervals (hourly, daily or weekly). As more new information 
flows to a market, more transactions occur and volatility becomes higher. In recent 
studies (e. g., Gallant et al., 1992; Lee and Rui, 2002), the positive relationship 
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between volatility and trading volume appears robust across various financial 
markets such as equity, currency and futures. This chapter examines whether the 
positive association between trading volume (volatility) and momentum profits 
persists after controlling for volatility (trading volume). 
This chapter is structured as follows: the next section presents the empirical 
findings; and section 7.3 summarises the chapter. 
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7.2 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
7.2.1 Volatility and Momentum Profitability 
This section examines the influence that volatility can have in determining 
momentum profits. Portfolios are formed by a two-way sort between the rank period 
share standard deviations (low-, 2-, 3-, 4-, and high-standard deviation) and rank 
period share returns (losers, 2,3,4 and winners). Stated another way, first, I 
generate five portfolios based on rank standard deviation and then, I calculate the 
momentum profitability that these portfolios achieve. 
Panel A of Table 7.1 shows that moving to shares with higher rank period standard 
deviation, losers (winners) achieve returns of 0.72 (1.42), 0.63 (1.54), 0.50 (1.70), 
0.08 (1.50) and -0.53 (0.94) per cent per month. Therefore, monthly continuation 
profits (W-L) are 0.70 per cent for the lowest volatility shares, 0.91 per cent for the 
second-lowest volatility companies, 1.20 per cent for the third-lowest volatility 
shares, 1.42 per cent for the fourth portfolio and 1.47 per cent for shares with the 
highest rank period volatility. Therefore, moving into shares with higher rank period 
volatility, there is a monotonic increase of continuation profitability driven by the 
loser portfolio. High volatility shares enjoy 0.77 (t-statistic=2.1 1) per cent higher 
monthly continuation profits than their counterpart low volatility companies. Notice 
that a strategy that buys winners with low rank period volatility and sells short 
losers with high rank period volatility generates monthly momentum profits of 1.95 
per cent. 
I also employ a non-parametric test to investigate the statistical significance of 
returns. Using the Mann-Whitney U test to compare the means of the W, L 
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portfolios, I find that the p-value is 0.008 (p<0.05) using the low volatility shares, 
0.001 using the second lowest volatility shares, 0.000 using the third lowest 
volatility companies, 0.000 employing the second highest volatility shares and 
0.009 employing the highest volatility firms. Then, I find that the p-value is 0.020 
(p<0.05) when I compare the momentum returns generated in the highest and lowest 
volatility shares. These suggest that when using a non-parametric test the findings 
concur with those generated using a parametric test. Momentum profits are more 
pronounced in high rank period volatility shares and the difference in momentum 
returns between high and low volatility shares is statistically significant. 
Volatility 
Low 2 3 4 High 
Median of W-L 0.65% 0.92% 1.13% 1.57% 1.60% 
Parametric p-value of W-L 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.009 
Non-parametric p-value of W-L 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.009 
Findings may vary using different sub-periods and therefore, I examine whether the 
finding that momentum profits are most pronounced in high volatility shares 
persists in different sub-periods. Panel B and Panel C of Table 7.1 divide the full 
period into two sub-periods of similar duration; 1975-1987 and 1988-2001. The 
finding that there exists a positive relationship between volatility and momentum 
profitability tends to persist in both sub-periods. Figure 7.1 shows the momentum 
profits generated employing the full sample and using shares with the lowest- and 
the highest- rank period volatility. I find that shares with high rank period volatility 
enjoy larger momentum profits than stocks with low rank period volatility (and the 
full sample) in 71 (and 62) per cent of the test periods. These findings indicate that 
the link between shares with high volatility and high momentum profits persists in 
the majority of the test periods and is not driven by few extreme results. 
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Table 7.1 
Volatility and Momentum Profits 
Volatility 
Full Sample Low 234 High 
Panel A: Entire Period (1975-2001) 
L 0.05% 0.72% 0.63% 0.50% 0.08% -0.53% 
0.11 3.56 3.06 2.11 0.25 -1.28 
2 0.85% 1.29% 1.01% 0.93% 0.77% 0.30% 
2.54 8.17 6.44 5.11 3.54 0.83 
3 1.05% 1.19% 1.26% 1.24% 0.96% 0.53% 
3.38 8.19 8.92 6.96 4.83 1.56 
4 1.23% 1.24% 1.39% 1.33% 1.35% 0.85% 
3.97 8.66 8.98 8.91 7.47 2.60 
W 1.31% 1.42% 1.54% 1.70% 1.50% 0.94% 
3.51 9.49 9.42 8.79 6.93 2.65 
W-L 1.26% 0.70% 0.91% 1.20% 1.42% 1.47% 
2.26 2.76 3.48 3.90 3.75 2.70 
Panel B: 1975-1987 
L 1.46% 1.58% 1.54% 1.69% 1.43% 1.18% 
5.17 5.91 6.40 5.98 4.49 2.60 
2 1.88% 2.17% 1.81% 1.96% 1.79% 1.78% 
9.30 10.52 9.54 10.70 7.27 4.95 
3 2.02% 1.87% 2.03% 2.09% 1.97% 2.13% 
10.52 9.54 10.30 10.76 8.62 6.35 
4 2.18% 2.00% 2.21% 2.19% 2.21% 2.04% 
10.17 9.57 10.47 10.29 9.23 5.31 
W 2.22% 2.04% 2.22% 2.50% 2.39% 2.03% 
7.18 10.39 9.44 9.42 8.43 4.44 
W-L 0.76% 0.47% 0.68% 0.81% 0.96% 0.85% 
1.81 1.40 2.02 2.08 2.26 1.32 
Panel C: 1988-2001 
L -1.17% -0.05% -0.20% -0.62% -1.21% -2.19% 
-2.74 -0.17 -0.64 -1.83 -2.47 -3.57 
2 0.03% 0.50% 0.29% -0.02% -0.19% -1.11 % 
0.10 2.24 1.20 -0.07 -0.57 -1.90 
3 0.29% 0.60% 0.57% 0.46% 0.03% -1.01% 
1.22 2.80 2.96 1.61 0.11 -1.93 
4 0.50% 0.55% 0.65% 0.55% 0.57% -0.29% 
2.41 3.01 3.05 2.92 2.22 -0.58 
W 0.61% 0.89% 0.95% 0.98% 0.69% -0.07% 
1.98 3.88 4.19 3.57 2.18 -0.13 
W-L 1.79% 0.94% 1.16% 1.60% 1.90% 2.12% 
3.38 2.50 2.95 3.66 3.26 2.61 
This table examines the influence that volatility has in determining momentum profits. Portfolios are 
formed by a two-way sort between the rank period share standard deviation and rank period share 
returns. In other words, first, I generate five portfolios based on rank period standard deviation and 
then, I calculate the momentum profitability that these portfolios achieve. 
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7.2.2 Volatility, Size and Momentum Profits 
Hong et al. (2000), using US data, and Doukas and McKnight (2003), using 
European data, report that beyond the first few small capitalisation portfolios, there 
is a continuous decline of momentum profits moving to portfolio of shares with 
higher market value. Given the influence that size of shares can have in the 
magnitude of momentum profits, I investigate whether volatility has an impact on 
the size of momentum profits when different size sub-sample portfolios are 
analysed. 
To set the stage, I first examine the momentum profits generated in different size 
shares. Portfolios are formed by a two-way sort between one year before the test 
period size (small-, medium- and large-size shares) and rank period share returns 
(losers, 2,3,4 and winners). Stated differently, I generate three portfolios based on 
market capitalisation and then, I calculate the momentum profitability that these 
portfolios achieve. 
Table 7.2 shows that the medium sized capitalisation portfolio (Panel B) displays 
the highest continuation profits (1.56 per cent per month), followed by the large 
(Panel C, 1.39 per cent per month) and then by the small size group (Panel A, 0.74 
per cent per month). This finding is consistent with Liu et al. (1999) using UK data 
and shows that momentum strategies are feasible since they do generate profitability 
in other than small capitalisation shares that may exhibit liquidity problems. 
To examine whether volatility has an impact on the size of momentum profits when 
different size sub-sample portfolios are analysed, portfolios are formed by a three- 
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way sort among one year before the test period size (three portfolios), rank period 
standard deviation (five portfolios) and rank period share returns (five portfolios). 
Stated differently, I undertake the same methodology used over Table 7.1 for 
different size shares. 
Lov 
Losers 234 Winners 
(.... The same division over all portfolios) 
Table 7.2 reports that a monotonic increase in momentum profitability arises as the 
investors move into higher volatility shares for medium- (Panel B) and large- 
capitalisation companies (Panel C), but not for small-capitalisation companies 
(Panel A). For example, in the large capitalisation portfolio, shares with the highest 
rank period volatility generate 2.35 per cent per month momentum profits. This 
finding shows that the positive association between momentum profits and volatility 
holds when different size shares are associated, beyond small size shares. 
Ful sample 
ow size 2 High size 
(.... The same division over all portfolios) 
latility 234 High Volatility 
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Table 7.2 
Size Sub-Samples 
Volatility 
Corresponding- Low 234 High 
size portfolio 
Panel A: Small Capitalisation Portfolio 
L 0.58% 0.90% 0.93% 0.51% 0.84% 0.41% 
1.60 2.91 2.65 1.28 2.30 0.79 
2 1.10% 1.33% 1.29% 1.05% 0.63% 0.73% 
3.88 5.47 4.58 3.11 1.83 1.54 
3 1.29% 1.36% 1.39% 1.32% 1.08% 1.00% 
5.47 5.95 6.08 5.19 3.52 2.14 
4 1.40% 1.43% 1.41% 1.70% 1.29% 0.46% 
5.34 7.18 5.57 6.12 4.03 1.22 
W 1.32% 1.69% 1.71% 1.50% 1.70% 0.55% 
4.67 7.09 6.75 5.76 4.95 1.33 
W-L 0.74% 0.79% 0.78% 0.99% 0.85% 0.14% 
1.62 2.03 1.80 2.07 1.70 0.22 
Panel B: Medium Capitalisation Portfolio 
L -0.18% 0.76% 0.46% 0.14% -0.01% -1.18% 
-0.50 3.32 1.90 0.54 -0.03 -2.52 
2 0.68% 1.17% 0.91% 0.69% 0.50% -0.45% 
3.03 6.92 4.55 2.85 1.73 -1.29 
3 1.04% 1.18% 1.17% 1.32% 0.91% -0.12% 
5.22 6.62 5.42 5.41 3.68 -0.35 
4 1.25% 1.13% 1.35% 1.32% 1.18% 0.87% 
6.75 6.34 5.84 6.04 4.74 2.56 
W 1.38% 1.54% 1.40% 1.68% 1.68% 0.73% 
6.37 8.78 6.76 6.59 7.77 2.18 
W-L 1.56% 0.79% 0.94% 1.53% 1.69% 1.91% 
3.70 2.74 2.92 4.19 4.23 3.32 
Panel C: Large Capitalisation Portfolio 
L 0.01% 0.63% 0.48% 0.49% 0.47% -1.10% 
0.04 3.79 2.87 2.82 2.06 -2.88 
2 1.05% 1.18% 1.10% 1.12% 0.90% 0.19% 
7.92 8.77 8.97 7.89 5.40 0.59 
3 1.09% 1.23% 1.37% 1.15% 0.94% 0.68% 
10.80 10.61 11.49 8.65 6.01 3.16 
4 1.23% 1.22% 1.30% 1.39% 1.13% 1.02% 
11.14 9.83 12.10 11.30 10.53 4.71 
W 1.40% 1.28% 1.47% 1.55% 1.50% 1.25% 
10.48 8.34 11.35 12.24 9.37 4.64 
W-L 1.39% 0.65% 0.99% 1.07% 1.03% 2.35% 
4.22 2.85 4.71 4.99 3.71 5.03 
This table investigates whether volatility has an impact on the size of momentum profits when 
different size sub-sample portfolios are analysed. Portfolios are formed by a three-way sort among 
one year before the test period size (three portfolios), rank period standard deviation (five portfolios) 
and rank period share returns (five portfolios). 
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7.2.3 Alternative Stock Market Structures 
Volatility and momentum profitability 
Chapter 6 documented that alternative trading mechanisms, due to their different 
institutional features, generate different continuation profits; shares in the automated 
trading sub-period demonstrate higher momentum profitability than shares in the 
floor trading sub-period. Since the post-automated period on the LSE has been 
characterised by higher volatility (Tonks and Webb, 1991), and this chapter has 
shown that volatility is associated strongly with momentum profits, the current 
section studies whether the stronger momentum profitability in the automated 
trading sub-period can be attributed to volatility. 
To test this assertion, I employ the concept of Sharpe ratio, which is widely used to 
examine the profitability of fund managers. The Sharpe ratio simply examines the 
return of a portfolio per unit of risk. Higher Sharpe ratio values imply stronger 
portfolio returns per unit of risk. I divide the portfolio returns achieved before and 
after the Big Bang with the standard deviation the portfolios displayed over the 
equivalent test periods. 
Table 7.3 shows that the risk-adjusted W-L portfolios in both before and after Big 
Bang have a positive sign, which indicates that the adjusted for standard deviation 
winner portfolio achieves stronger return than the adjusted for standard deviation 
loser portfolio. This happens because winners achieve stronger returns and display 
lower standard deviation than counterpart losers. Then, I compare the adjusted for 
risk momentum returns generated before and after the deregulation. Table indicates 
that the stronger momentum returns generated in shares in the automated period 
cannot be captured by differences in volatility. The Sharpe ratio for the W-L 
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portfolio is still stronger during the post-Big Bang period. This finding suggests that 
the organisation of a stock market influences the momentum profits even after 
considering differences in volatility. 
Table 7.3 
Standardised Returns 
Floor Sub-Period 
(1975-1986) 
Automated Sub-Period 
(1987-2001) 
L 0.11 -0.07 
2 0.18 0.01 
3 0.22 0.04 
4 0.23 0.06 
W 0.18 0.06 
W-L 0.08 0.13 
This table studies whether the higher momentum profitability in the automated than the floor sub- 
period (Chapter 6) can be attributed to volatility. I divide the portfolio returns achieved before and 
after the Big Bang with the standard deviation the portfolio displayed over the equivalent test 
periods. Higher values imply stronger portfolio returns per unit risk. 
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7.2.4 Volatility, Trading Volume and Momentum Profitability 
One of the most significant studies in the field of momentum effect is that by Lee 
and Swaminathan (2000). They sort independently shares into portfolios based on 
past returns and trading volume, and show that securities with high trading volumes 
display greater momentum profitability than their low trading volume counterparts. 
However a positive association between volatility and trading volume exists 
(Karpoff, 1987), the more new information that flows to a market, the more 
transactions occur and the higher the volatility becomes. Since I reported the role of 
volatility in influencing momentum profits and Lee and Swaminathan reported the 
role of trading volume in influencing continuation profits, I investigate the 
intersections of various trading and volatility portfolios. 
This study first undertakes an out-of-sample test to examine whether Lee and 
Swaminathan's result persists using UK data. I replicate Lee and Swaminathan 
(2000), by forming portfolios after a two-way independent sort between past stock 
returns and trading volume, to examine the significance of trading volume in 
momentum profits. I assign stocks to 5 portfolios based on returns over the rank 
period and one of three portfolios based on the trading volume 1 year before the test 
period. The intersections resulting from the two independent rankings give rise to 15 
portfolios. I calculate the return of those portfolios over the subsequent test period. 
Table 7.4 shows that results tend to be consistent with Lee and Swaminathan (2000) 
who employ US data. High trading volume shares generate larger momentum 
profits than the counterpart low trading volume shares. Momentum profits increase 
monotonically moving from shares with low trading volume to shares with high 
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trading volume. Interestingly, only high trading volume shares generate statistical 
significant momentum profits. These findings suggest that the Lee and 
Swaminathan's finding persists when UK data are employed. 
Since I reported that there exists a positive relationship between trading volume and 
continuation gains, then I investigate various intersections among trading volume 
and volatility portfolios. Portfolios are formed using a three-way independent sort 
between rank period stock returns, rank period standard deviation (low-, medium- 
and high-standard deviation) and one year before the test period trading volume 
(low-, medium- and high-volume). This methodology allows generating a more 
equal standard deviation (trading volume) match across different trading volume 
(standard deviation) portfolios. Stated differently, this test investigates the 
momentum profits generated in different volatility (trading volume) portfolios after 
matching for trading volume (volatility). 
Table 7.5 shows the returns of the loser portfolio (Panel A), the winner portfolio 
(Panel B) and the arbitrage portfolio (Panel Q. Results demonstrate that after 
controlling for volatility (trading volume), trading volume (volatility) tends to keep 
its ability to influence the momentum profitability. Only among medium volatility 
portfolios, trading volume cannot influence the magnitude of momentum profits. 
These findings suggest that the findings of Lee and Swaminathan and of this study 
tend to hold when the intersections between both findings are investigated. 
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Table 7.4 
Momentum Profitability and Trading Volume 
Trading Volume 
Low 2 High 
L -1.09% -1.04% -0.50% 
-1.78 -1.63 -0.86 
2 -0.30% 0.07% 0.51% 
-0.44 0.17 1.06 
3 -0.22% 0.73% 0.63% 
-0.45 1.97 1.68 
4 -0.08% 0.28% 0.76% 
-0.14 0.71 2.03 
W 0.37% 0.58% 1.37% 
0.79 1.06 3.37 
W-L 1.46% 1.62% 1.87% 
1.90 1.93 2.63 
This table replicates Lee and Swaminathan (2000), by forming portfolios after an independent two- 
way sort between past stock returns and trading volume, to examine the significance of trading 
volume in momentum profits. I assign stocks to 5 portfolios based on returns over the rank period 
and one of three portfolios based on the trading volume during 1 year before the test period. The 
intersections resulting from the two independent rankings give rise to 15 portfolios. I calculate the 
return of those portfolios over the subsequent test period. 
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Table 7.5 
Volatility, Trading Volume and Momentum Profits 
Low Volume Medium Volume High Volume 
Panel A: Losers 
Std L 1.00% 0.00% -0.48% 1.30 0.00 -0.93 
Std M -1.07% -1.41% 0.60% 
-1.44 -2.01 0.88 
Std H -1.31% -1.08% -0.83% 
-1.80 -1.50 -1.15 
Panel B: Winners 
Std L 1.50% 0.97% 1.76% 
2.67 2.15 2.93 
Std M 0.66% 1.16% 0.91% 
1.28 1.74 1.62 
Std H -0.20% 0.09% 1.62% 
-0.30 0.12 2.83 
Panel C: Arbitrage portfolio (W-L) 
Std L 0.49% 0.96% 2.12% 
0.85 1.51 2.81 
Std M 1.73% 2.58% 0.31% 
1.91 2.65 0.35 
Std II 1.11% 1.18% 2.44% 
1.11 1.13 2.67 
This table examines whether trading volume affects momentum profitability after adjusting for 
volatility. Portfolios are formed using a three-way independent sort between rank period stock 
returns, rank period standard deviation (low-, medium- and high-standard deviation) and one year 
before the test period trading volume (low-, medium- and high-volume). This methodology allows 
generating a more equal standard deviation (trading volume) match across different trading volume 
(volatility) portfolios. Std denotes standard deviation. 
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7.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined whether momentum profitability is associated with firms' 
past volatility. I report that volatility has a significant impact on the size of 
momentum profits. Shares with high (low) rank period volatility tend to generate 
high (low) momentum profitability. For higher volatility equities, monthly 
continuation profits (W-L) are 0.70,0.91,1.20,1.42 and 1.47 per cent, where the 
full sample displays momentum payoffs at 1.26 per cent per month. High volatility 
shares enjoy 0.77 (t-statistic=2.1 1) per cent higher monthly continuation profits than 
their counterpart low volatility companies. Volatility further has a positive impact 
on the size of momentum profits when medium- and large- capitalisation shares are 
employed. This is not true when small- size stocks are considered. It is further 
investigated the association between volatility, trading volume and the magnitude of 
continuation profits. After controlling for trading volume (volatility), volatility 
(trading volume) tends to keep influencing the magnitude of momentum profits. 
Beyond the finding that momentum profits vary in portfolios formed on the basis of 
historical standard deviations, this study states further significant findings. 
Consistent with Liu et al. (1999) using UK data, it found that momentum strategies 
are feasible since they do provide profitability in other than only small capitalisation 
shares that exhibit liquidity problems. Constructing three size-portfolios, this study 
reports that the medium sized capitalisation portfolio displays the highest 
continuation profits (1.56 per cent per month), followed by the large (1.39 per cent 
per month) and then, by the small size group (0.74 per cent per month). Consistent 
further with Lee and Swaminathan (2000). who employ US data, this study shows 
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that there exists a positive association between trading volume and momentum 
gains. 
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Chapter 8 
MOMENTUM PROFITS FOLLOWING BULL AND BEAR MARKETS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the magnitude of momentum profitability in 
bull and bear markets. Momentum profits stem from the winner shares in bull 
markets and from the loser stocks in bear markets. But, are momentum profits 
stronger following bull or bear markets? 
Recent studies have investigated the field without however reaching a consensus, 
since results from different data sets often conflict. Griffin et al. (2003) report that 
momentum profits are stronger following bear markets. The momentum profitability 
following bear markets is 1.53,0.77,0.55,0.68 and 1.04 per cent per month in 
Africa, America, Asia, Europe and the US market respectively, while the 
continuation profits that follow bull markets tend to be lower, at 1.27,0.73, -0.10, 
0.76 and 0.31 respectively, in the same international markets. Rey and Schmid, 
(2003) using data from the Swiss Market, also state that momentum profits are 
stronger in a sub-period where a bear market is present. 
However, Cooper et al. (2004) who employ US data alone from between 1929 and 
1995 arrive at the opposite finding. Momentum profits that follow positive market 
returns are 0.93 per cent per month and continuation gains that follow negative 
market returns are -0.37 per cent per month. The paradox is that Griffin et al. 
(2003), among international markets, also include the US market from 1926 to 2000 
and reach the opposite conclusion. Both studies employ monthly share returns for 
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all NYSE and AMEX shares from CRSP and define bull and bear markets based on 
market performance. The different results that emerge when different data sets are 
examined pose an interesting query that requires further examination. 
In addition, the impact of bull and bear markets in various finance fields shows that 
contradictory findings emerge when the full, the bull or the bear market periods are 
investigated. The beta-return relationship has been one of the most intriguing issues 
in modem finance'. Earlier studies (e. g., Black et al., 1972; Fama and MacBeth, 
1973) reported that beta has only limited power to explain share returns. Results did 
not show a perfect relationship with the theoretical CAPM, but plot points were 
placed around the market line. Recent studies (e. g., Black, 1993; Fama and French, 
1992) offer more criticism. Some researchers concluded that beta is dead and is not 
able to explain asset returns (e. g, Strong and Xu, 1997). However, Pettengill et al. 
(1995) examine beta in up and down markets. Using US data from 1936 to 1990, 
they find that in bull markets (when the market provides higher performance than 
the risk-free rate interest), there is a significant positive relation between beta and 
share returns, while in bear markets, there is an important negative association. 
Pettengill et al. (1995) conclude that beta is far from dead. 
Value Line Ranking is a stock market anomaly that ranks shares from one to five 
according to their expected performances in the subsequent six to twelve months. 
Group 1 has the best return prospects, while group 5 the worst. Black (1973) reports 
that the top ranked group generates an excess return from the market of 10 per cent 
1 Fama and French (2003) extensively review the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
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per year, while the fifth category provides losses of 10 per cent per year. However, 
Moy et al. (1995) examine the profitability that Value Line Ranking provides in bull 
and bear markets. They find that this anomaly offers asymmetric profits; 
exceptionally high profits during bull markets (when market achieves positive 
return or higher performance than the risk-free rate interest), but a very poor 
performance during bear conditions. Thus, findings are contradictory depending 
upon whether the profitability of Value Line Ranking is analysed in the full period 
or in bull and bear markets separately. 
In addition, the theory underpinning international diversification states that 
investors can maintain returns while reducing risk by holding shares from 
international exchanges (e. g., Solnik, 1974). This benefit stems from the negative 
correlation coefficients that may exist between returns in international stock 
markets. Butler and Joaquin (2002) examine the correlation in returns from 
countries in bear, normal and bull market periods. They find that when domestic 
returns move downwards, the equity prices in different international countries also 
decline. However, when domestic returns are normal or move upward, the same 
trend is not apparent in international data. In other words, the correlation among 
returns from different countries is significantly higher in down, rather than in calm 
and up, markets. Butler and Joaquin conclude that the benefits of diversification are 
weaker in bear market conditions. 
Since studies using different data do not arrive at consensus for the association 
between momentum profits and bull and bear markets as well as since findings in 
various finance fields are not persistent when one investigates the full period or the 
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bull and bear markets separately, this thesis intends to examine the magnitude of 
momentum profits following bull and bear markets using UK data. This chapter is 
organised as follows: section 8.2 reports the empirical findings, and section 8.3 
concludes the chapter. 
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8.2 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
8.2.1 Momentum Profits Following Bull and Bear Markets 
I define bull and bear markets using two states; the state where average market 
returns (FTSE-A11 Share) prior to the test period are positive (bull condition) and 
negative (bear state). I examine various horizons to define the past market returns; 
using the performance of the market index over the past 1 month (Panel A of Table 
8.1), 3 months (Panel B), 6 months (Panel C) and 12 months before the test period 
(Panel D)2. When longer periods to define the state of the market are employed, the 
number of periods in which the market index was negative is significantly lower 
due to the strong bull market on the LSE between 1975 and 2001. The market 
experienced negative performances in 20 (out of 51) periods when the 1 month 
definition is used, in 15 periods when the 3 months definition is employed, in 9 
periods when the 6 months definition is used and in 7 periods when the 12 months 
definition is employed. 
Table 8.1 shows that the momentum profits for all alternative definitions of bull and 
bear markets are stronger following bear conditions. For example, when the market 
performance over the previous six months is employed, monthly momentum profits 
are 1.86 per cent following bear markets and 1.13 per cent following bull markets. 
Therefore, investors can achieve superior momentum returns following the 
momentum strategy when the market returns over the past were poor. Momentum 
2 There are no negative average market returns when I consider the market performance in equal or 
longer than two-year periods. This happens because of the strong bull market on the UK market over 
the sample period. 
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profits are 1.26 per cent per month using the full periods, but investors can achieve 
monthly momentum profits of 1.55,1.72,1.86 and 2.15 undertaking the momentum 
strategy after the bear state. The longer the period to define the bear market, the 
smaller the number of periods in which the market index was negative and the 
stronger the momentum profits that achieved. Besides, investors that undertake the 
momentum strategy following the bear state are subject to limited buying and 
selling-short signals and thus, transaction costs can cover only a small part of the 
documented abnormal profitability. 
Figures 8.1 to 8.4 show the momentum profits that generated following bull and 
bear markets for the alternative definitions of the states. An investor that adopts the 
momentum strategy after a bear state can hardly ever face losses throughout the 
sample period. The number of periods that a trader would achieve negative 
momentum returns is at maximum once. 
Until now I investigated whether momentum profits vary following bull and bear 
markets. It is interesting to examine whether there exists a general association 
between momentum returns and past market returns. I separate seven states; 0-2 
indicates the two periods when the market returns were at maximum, 0-5 shows the 
five periods when the market returns were the best and in a similar way I take also 
into account the periods; 0-10,0-20,0-30,0-40 and 0-50. I employ this 
methodology for all four alternative definitions of the bull and bear states. Table 8.2 
shows that including periods that past market returns were less significant, 
momentum profits tend to rise. For example, when the 6 months past market returns 
definition is employed, the monthly momentum profits are -1.16, -0.05,0.17,0.71, 
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1.00,1.14 and 1.28 per cent moving to periods that include smaller magnitude of 
market profits. These findings indicate that a general negative association between 
. -W-L returns and past market performance exists. 
In addition, a regression analysis is adopted to examine the relationship between 
momentum and market returns. Until now I investigated only the association 
between past market returns and continuation profits. It is interesting also to 
examine whether there is any association between the market returns over the test 
period and the momentum profits. I run the following regression: 
W-L=a+b_ Past 
_ 
Market 
_ 
Re turns +c 
_Test _ 
Period 
_ 
Market returns +E 
Table 8.3 shows that the Pearson correlations between the dependent and both 
independent variables are negative. The stronger negative correlation is between 
momentum profits and lagged market returns, which is equal to -0.31 (p<0.05). Test 
period market returns and momentum profits are only slightly negative associated 
equal to -0.03. When the regression analysis is employed, the sensitivity on the 
lagged market factor is -0.31, which indicates a negative association between W-L 
and prior market returns and the coefficient is statistical significant at the 5% level. 
The sensitivity on the test period market factor shows that momentum profits are 
only slightly negative associated. These findings support that a general negative 
relationship between momentum profits and lagged market returns is documented 
when a new methodology is employed. 
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Table 8.1 
Momentum Profitability Following Bull and Bear Markets 
R. z0 Rm <0 Rm 2ý 0 R. <0 
Panel A: I month Panel B: 3 months 
L -0.03% 0.17% L 0.43% -0.87% 
-0.05 0.37 0.84 -1.26 
2 0.72% 1.06% 2 1.05% 0.38% 
1.42 2.89 2.44 0.74 
3 0.92% 1.25% 3 1.22% 0.64% 
2.02 3.25 3.06 1.36 
4 1.08% 1.47% 4 1.40% 0.84% 
2.37 3.83 3.46 1.87 
W 1.04% 1.72% W 1.50% 0.85% 
1.82 4.75 2.99 1.92 
W-L 1.08% 1.55% W-L 1.07% 1.72% 
1.26 2.67 1.50 2.09 
Panel C: 6 months Panel D: 12 months 
L 0.18% -1.02% L 0.17% -1.30% 
0.66 -1.14 0.62 -1.45 
2 0.83% 0.55% 2 0.85% 0.29% 
4.27 0.86 4.42 0.45 
3 1.02% 0.76% 3 1.01% 0.74% 
5.96 1.60 5.92 1.55 
4 1.20% 0.96% 4 1.18% 1.01% 
6.80 2.63 6.70 2.77 
W 1.32% 0.84% W 1.30% 0.85% 
5.08 2.34 4.99 2.36 
W-L 1.13% 1.86% W-L 1.12% 2.15% 
2.98 1.92 3.04 1.82 
R. >_ 0 and R,, <0 represent periods when the market index (FTSE-All share) generates positive 
and negative past performances respectively. Panels A, B, C and D use respectively 1,3,6 and 12 
months market performance prior to the test period to define the bull and bear states. 
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Table 8.2. Momentum Profits and Past Market Returns 
0-2 0-5 0-10 0-20 0-30 0-40 0-50 
Panel A: I month 
L 1.20% 0.15% -0.65% 1.00% -0.04% -0.05% -0.04% 0.69 0.16 -0.75 1.45 -0.07 -0.11 -0.09 
2 1.29% 0.64% -0.02% 1.38% 0.67% 0.75% 0.76% 
0.69 0.82 -0.03 2.33 1.27 1.89 2.29 
3 1.73% 0.90% 0.23% 1.51% 0.88% 0.96% 0.97% 
1.15 1.19 0.32 2.63 1.87 2.69 3.13 
4 1.99% 0.98% 0.23% 1.61% 1.03% 1.12% 1.15% 
1.28 1.21 0.30 2.64 2.20 3.15 3.72 
W 2.71% 1.27% -0.20% 1.50% 1.00% 1.13% 1.23% 
1.78 1.33 -0.19 1.89 1.69 2.52 3.27 
W-L 1.52% 1.12% 0.45% 0.50% 1.04% 1.18% 1.27% 
0.66 0.83 0.33 0.47 1.18 1.46 2.25 
Panel B: 3 months 
L -0.70% 1.02% 0.21% 0.97% 0.21% 0.06% 0.02% 
-0.19 0.67 0.24 1.49 0.35 0.11 0.04 
2 -0.54% 1.18% 0.65% 1.55% 0.90% 0.83% 0.84% 
-0.15 0.78 0.80 2.59 1.77 2.02 2.43 
3 -0.71% 0.88% 0.67% 1.59% 1.06% 1.02% 1.04% 
-0.18 0.59 0.88 2.75 2.23 2.68 3.25 
4 -0.85% 0.53% 0.54% 1.62% 1.22% 1.21% 1.22% 
-0.19 0.34 0.68 2.63 2.56 3.17 3.82 
W -1.70% -0.31% 0.14% 1.53% 1.24% 1.34% 1.30% 
-0.29 -0.14 0.13 1.94 2.12 2.86 3.38 
W-L -1.00% -1.33% -0.07% 0.56% 1.03% 1.28% 1.28% 
-0.14 -0.50 -0.05 0.55 1.23 1.85 2.23 
Panel C: 6 months 
L -0.07% 0.59% 0.80% 0.19% 0.16% 0.41% 0.02% 
-0.02 0.37 0.81 0.31 0.34 0.94 0.04 
2 0.52% 1.07% 1.05% 0.79% 0.82% 1.05% 0.84% 
0.11 0.62 1.11 1.49 2.06 2.87 2.43 
3 0.30% 1.05% 1.18% 0.89% 0.98% 1.24% 1.04% 
0.06 0.57 1.21 1.59 2.43 3.52 3.25 
4 0.08% 0.96% 1.24% 0.94% 1.09% 1.43% 1.22% 
0.02 0.49 1.21 1.65 2.68 3.92 3.82 
W -1.23% 0.55% 0.97% 0.90% 1.16% 1.56% 1.30% 
-0.19 0.23 0.81 1.41 2.34 3.48 3.38 
W-L -1.16% -0.05% 0.17% 0.71 ° 1.00% 1.14% 1.28% 
-0.54 -0.06 0.11 0.37 1.45 1.83 2.31 
Panel D: 12 months 
L 1.98% 0.85% 0.62% 0.13% 0.11% 0.42% 0.10% 
0.89 0.57 0.63 0.20 0.19 0.96 0.23 
2 2.50% 1.12% 1.18% 0.79% 0.76% 1.05% 0.87% 
0.89 0.69 1.35 1.43 1.68 2.80 2.52 
3 2.22% 0.97% 1.14% 0.98% 0.96% 1.20% 1.06% 
0.73 0.57 1.17 1.72 2.18 3.35 3.32 
4 2.46% 0.97% 1.24% 1.11% 1.14% 1.34% 1.25% 
0.84 0.54 1.22 1.91 2.48 3.67 3.90 
W 2.26% 0.42% 1.00% 1.06% 1.12% 1.40% 1.35% 
0.77 0.19 0.86 1.64 2.02 3.19 3.51 
W-L 0.27% -0.42% 0.38% 0.93% 1.01% 0.98% 1.25% 
0.07 -0.16 0.25 1.01 1.31 1.57 2.18 
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This table shows the momentum profits generated in alternative past market returns. For example, 0- 
2 indicates the two periods when the market returns were at maximum, 0-5 shows the five periods 
when the market returns were the best and in a similar approach I take also into account the periods; 
0-10,0-20,0-30,0-40 and 0-50. Panels A, B, C and D use respectively 1,3,6 and 12 months market 
performance prior to the test period to define the bull and bear states. 
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Table 8.3 
Momentum Profits, Past and Present Market Returns 
W-L=a+b Past Market Re turns +c Test Period Market returns +c 
abc Rz 
1.63% -0.311 -0.008 0.06 
(5.36) (-2.26) (-0.06) 
Pearson Correlation 
W-L Past Market Returns Test Period Market Returns 
W-L 1 
Past Market Returns -0.31* 1 
Test Period Market Returns -0.03 0.08 1 
*p<0.05 
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8.2.2 A More Extreme Definition of Bull and Bear Markets 
Until now I examined the influence of bull and bear markets on momentum profits 
focusing on market returns to define the different states. A more extreme definition 
of bull and bear markets is employed. I construct two portfolios by sorting 
companies on the basis of share performances over the rank period. The first 
portfolio includes shares with positive average rank period returns (bull market 
state) and the second portfolio contains shares with negative average rank period 
performances (bear market state). Due to the strong bull market on the LSE during 
the 1975-2001 period, on average 1,184 stocks enjoyed positive rank period returns 
and only 701 shares achieved negative rank period performances. 
Table 8.4 shows the returns that the two sub-samples with positive and negative 
rank period returns generate. This table shows that shares with negative average 
rank period performances generate greater momentum payoffs than their counterpart 
with average rank period positive returns. Securities with prior losses generate 
monthly momentum profits of 1.05 per cent driven by the loser portfolio and shares 
with past gains demonstrate continuation profitability of 0.24 per cent per month 
driven by the winner portfolio. The difference in momentum profits between shares 
with negative and positive lag returns is 0.81 per cent per month with a significant t- 
statistic of 2.43 (p-value=0.017). 
I also employ a non-parametric test to investigate the statistical significance of 
returns. Using the Mann-Whitney U test to compare the means of the W, L 
portfolios, I find that the p-value is 0.44 (p>0.05) using shares with positive rank 
period returns and 0.003 (p<0.05) using shares with negative rank period 
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performances. Then, I find that the p-value is 0.012 (p<0.05) when I compare the 
momentum returns generated in shares with positive and negative past returns. 
These suggest that using a non-parametric test findings concur with those generated 
using a parametric test. Momentum profits are more pronounced in shares with 
negative lag returns and the difference in momentum returns between shares with 
positive and negative returns is statistically significant. 
Median Parametric p-value Non-parametric p-value 
W-L following bull markets 0.25% 0.41 0.44 
W-L following bear markets 1.10% 0.011 0.003 
This study further defines bull market for shares that provide positive returns for 
each month of the rank period. There are on average only 126 shares that meet that 
condition. Similar to the other definition of bull market, shares with positive returns 
in each of the rank period generate economically insignificant momentum profits of 
0.31 (t-statistic=0.55) per cent per month. 
To explain the large magnitude of momentum profits in shares with poor lagged 
returns, I consider the disposition effect that states that investors tend to sell winners 
and hold on to losers. Therefore, past loser shares appear to keep the momentum in 
returns, while prior winner shares tend not to display significant continuation in 
prices. The finding that momentum profits are stronger following bear markets is 
also consistent with Chapter 7 where I reported that there exists a strong positive 
association between momentum profits and volatility. Koutmos (1999) finds that 
volatility is significantly higher in bear markets. Considering the result of Chapter 7 
with Koutmos's finding, we would expect that bear markets display high volatility 
and demonstrate high momentum profits. 
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I also address the issue in general and analyses whether the profitability of 
momentum strategies is related to past share returns. To test this assertion, five 
approximately equal number of stock portfolios are constructed based on monthly 
share returns in the rank period: shares with prior losses over -2 per cent, between - 
2 and 0 per cent, from 0 to 2 per cent, from 2 to 5 per cent and over 5 per cent and I 
calculate the continuation profits that the above five portfolios demonstrate. 
Table 8.5 shows that when we move from securities with high prior losses to shares 
with large rank period gains, momentum profitability tends to fall. Monthly 
momentum profits are 0.89 per cent for shares with prior losses over -2 per cent, 
0.18 per cent for shares with prior losses between -2 and 0 per cent, 0.04 per cent 
for companies with slight gains from 0 to 2 per cent, 0.22 per cent for shares with 
significant gains from 2 to 5 per cent and -0.42 per cent for firms with extreme past 
gains over 5 per cent. In other words, shares that demonstrated over 5 per cent past 
gains generate monthly continuation profits of -0.42 per cent. This suggests that 
there exists a negative association between share returns and momentum profits, 
which is driven by the loser portfolio. 
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Table 8.4 
Momentum Profitability in Shares with Negative and Positive Past Returns 
Riz0 R, <0 
L 0.97% -0.31% 
6.16 -0.83 
2 1.09% 0.22% 
7.35 0.85 
3 1.12% 0.26% 
7.12 1.13 
4 1.25% 0.59% 
7.00 3.05 
W 1.21% 0.75% 
5.08 4.67 
W-L 0.24% 1.05% 
0.84 2.62 
This table indicates bull and bear markets applying to security returns. Two portfolios are formed by 
sorting by share performance over the rank period: shares with either positive or negative average 
rank returns, and I examine the continuation that these two portfolios demonstrate. Rt >_ 0 and 
Ri <0 represent shares with positive and negative past performances respectively. 
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Table 8.5 
Momentum Profitability and Past Share Returns 
R<<-2% -2%SR<<0% . 
0%_<R, <2% 2%SR, <5% 5%: 5 R, 
L -0.54% 0.51% 1.03% 1.06% 1.33% 
-1.25 2.20 4.56 6.57 6.45 
2 0.00% 0.70% 0.87% 1.01% 1.30% 
-0.01 3.56 5.53 5.32 5.90 
3 0.19% 0.68% 1.03% 1.21% 1.35% 
0.66 3.51 6.86 7.59 5.76 
4 -0.01% 0.74% 0.95% 1.33% 1.39% 
-0.06 4.14 5.61 7.14 5.82 
W 0.35% 0.69% 1.07% 1.28% 0.91% 
1.72 4.24 7.20 6.88 2.62 
W-L 0.89% 0.18% 0.04% 0.22% -0.42% 
1.86 0.63 0.14 0.88 -1.03 
This table addresses the issue in general and analyses whether the profitability of momentum 
strategies is related to past share returns. Five portfolios are constructed based on share returns in the 
rank period: shares with prior losses over -2, between -2 and 0, from 0 to 2, from 2 to 5 and over 5 
per cent per month and I calculate the continuation that the above five portfolios demonstrate. 
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8.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter investigated whether different market states influence the magnitude of 
momentum profitability. The motivation to investigate that association is that 
opposite findings are emerged in various finance fields when the full, the bull or the 
bear market periods are investigated separately (e. g., Pettengill et al., 1995). 
Besides, Griffin et al. (2003) who employed international data, and Cooper et al. 
(2004) who used US data alone, found opposite findings according to which state 
generates stronger momentum profits. Griffin et al. document that continuation 
gains are stronger following bear markets and Cooper et al. report that momentum 
profits are larger following bull markets. This study investigated the momentum 
profits generated following bull and bear markets using UK data. 
This study classified bull and bear markets based on two definitions: individual 
share returns and market index performances. Findings shown that continuation 
profits are stronger following negative share and market returns, which might be a 
reflection of mean reversion in the market. Shares with prior losses (gains) generate 
on average 1.05 (0.24) per cent monthly momentum profitability and when the 
lagged 6-month market returns are negative (positive), monthly momentum profits 
are 1.86 (1.13) per cent. These suggested that investors can achieve superior 
momentum returns following the momentum strategy when the market return over 
the rank period is negative. 
One suggestion that may help explain the high momentum profits in shares with 
poor lagged returns would be to reconcile the findings of this chapter with the 
disposition effect that states that investors tend to sell winners and to hold on to 
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losers. Therefore, past loser shares appear to keep the momentum in returns, while 
prior winner shares tend not to display significant continuation in prices. 
Further analysis addressed the issue in general and analysed whether the 
profitability of momentum strategies is related to past market/share returns. I 
separated different states according to the past market and share performances and I 
run a regression to investigate whether the past market returns as an independent 
variable can influence significantly the momentum profits as a dependent variable. 
Overall, I found that tests supported the existence of a general negative association 
between momentum profits and market/share returns. 
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Chapter 9 
REVERSAL, MOMENTUM AND HYBRID STRATEGIES 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 3 reviewed the winner-loser effect rather than the momentum effect only. 
The motivation was that momentum, short-, and long-term overreaction effects are 
similar anomalies using different time horizons. This section undertakes an out-of- 
sample test of whether a strategy that combines long-term overreaction and 
momentum effects can generate significant abnormal profits. The overreaction 
anomaly utilises long-horizon returns and proposes a strategy that buys past losers 
and sells short prior winners. The momentum effect focuses on medium-horizon 
returns and suggests a strategy that buys prior winners and sells short past losers. 
The combination strategy buys past losers over the long-period and past winners 
over the medium-horizon. 
Balvers and Wu (2002) employ international market indexes and introduce a 
strategy that reconciles momentum and reversal effects. They bought country 
indexes with the best returns over the past medium-term horizon and with the worst 
returns over the prior long-term period. They report that the combination method 
generates significantly superior gains than the individual momentum and reversal 
strategies. This study examines whether Balvers and Wu's finding is limited to 
market index data only. I use share returns from the London Stock Exchange and 
employ only the representative momentum and overreaction strategies. 
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This chapter is organised as follows: section 9.2 reports the empirical findings and 
section 9.3 concludes the chapter. 
9.2 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
A similar methodology used for the momentum effect is applied to calculate the 
overreaction profits when different time horizons are analysed. To calculate the 
reversal profits, only the representative overreaction strategy is examined where 
three years rank and three years for the test period has being analysed. Five 
portfolios are generated by sorting shares on the basis of their previous three-year 
returns (rank period). W represents the portfolio with the best past performance and 
L indicates the portfolio with the worst prior return. I calculate the equal-weighted 
returns of the quintile portfolios over the following three years (test period). This 
procedure is repeated for each non-overlapping three-year period. The arbitrage 
portfolio L-W, which buys previous losers and sells short past winners, indicates the 
gains. 
This study investigates whether the pure long-term reversal strategy generates 
economic profits using our sample of firms. Panel A of Table 9.1 shows that 
monthly portfolio returns are 0.83 per cent in the loser portfolio, 0.90 per cent in the 
second portfolio, 1.00 per cent in the third portfolio, 0.77 per cent in the fourth 
portfolio and 0.58 per cent in the winner portfolio. Therefore, past losers outperform 
prior winners over the test period by 0.25 (t-statistic=0.54) per cent per month. 
Although losers generate on average only slightly higher gains than their 
counterpart winners, losers outperformed winners in 75 per cent of the test periods. 
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Interestingly, the magnitude of profits is approximately five times lower using the 
reversal strategy than employing the counterpart momentum approach. 
These results concur with the findings of Campbell and Limmack (1997) and Clare 
and Thomas (1995) who using UK data, report that contrarian payoffs are weaker 
than those documented by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) who employ US data. The 
basic difference between DeBondt and Thaler and this study is the definition of 
winners and losers. They only employ the top and bottom 35 stocks to form 
portfolios, when the selection of extreme winners and losers produces high reversal 
gains. 
We now examine the profitability that a hybrid strategy can offer. This study 
investigates whether a strategy that buys prior winners over the previous six months 
and prior losers over the past three years can enjoy superior gains. Based on reversal 
and momentum portfolios, a hybrid strategy is followed. A portfolio is formed that 
buys past winners over the previous six months and past losers over the past three 
years. The performance of this portfolio is calculated over the subsequent test 
period. his strategy is defined as WL where W shows the portfolio bought in 
medium-horizon and L demonstrates the portfolio bought in long-horizon. 
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Past 
, 
`Npw' `Future' 
-3 years -7 'months 6 4nonths 3 years 
Rank Periods Skip Test periods 
Losers over the past 3 years ====> Buy 
WL 
Winners over the past 6 months "> Buy 
Consistent with Balvers and Wu (2002), Panel A of Table 9.1 shows that the 
combination portfolio achieves large profits at 1.29 (t-statistic=3.54) per cent per 
month driven by the winner portfolio. This suggests that this method enjoys 
significantly higher yield than the counterpart reversal strategy. However, in 
contrast to Balvers and Wu, the combination strategy demonstrates only a little 
higher return than the momentum method on its own. This suggests that Balvers and 
Wu's findings hold partially when we employ UK share returns. 
This study further examines whether the profitability of the hybrid strategy varies 
during different sub-periods. Panel B of Table 9.1 studies the 1975-1987 period, 
when the returns across all quintile portfolios are strong, and shows that the WL 
strategy enjoys much higher payoffs than both reversal and momentum strategies. 
The magnitude of the hybrid profits extends to 2.01 (t-statistic=3.63) per cent per 
month. However, Panel C shows that from 1988 to 2001, when the performances 
across all quintile portfolios are low, the WL approach achieves gains of only 0.55 
(t-statistic-1.31) per cent. Therefore, the out performance of the combination 
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strategy is most pronounced in the first sub-period when all quintiles enjoy 
significant returns. 
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9.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter briefly investigated whether investors can enjoy superior performances 
by combining the momentum and reversal effects. A combination portfolio was 
formed that buys past winners over the previous six months and past losers over the 
past three years. Overall, results concur partially with Balvers and Wu (2002). The 
hybrid strategy provides significant abnormal profits at 1.29 per cent per month. 
This profitability is significantly larger than that gained by the counterpart reversal 
strategy, but only a little higher than that found by the momentum strategy. The 
hybrid strategy tends to outperform significantly both counterpart methods during 
strong bull markets. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Conclusion 
10.1 SUMMARY 
This study investigated a field concerned with stock market anomalies, by analysing 
the momentum effect that states that shares achieving the highest (lowest) 
performance over the previous three to twelve months continue to perform well 
(disappointingly) over the subsequent three to twelve months. The thesis was 
separated into eight main chapters. 
Chapters 2 and 3 presented the review of the relevant literatures. Chapter 2 looked 
at the main topic of market efficiency and highlighted that the debate about the 
efficient market hypothesis is far from over. There are various investment strategies 
that promise risk-adjusted returns in excess of the market performance. For 
instance, small capitalisation shares achieve higher returns than their large 
capitalisation counterparts (Bann, 1981); shares demonstrate significantly higher 
performances during the month of January (Rozeff and Kiney, 1976); low PIE 
equities appear to outperform shares in high PIE firms (Basu, 1977). However, these 
stock market anomalies have themselves been the subject of severe criticism. 
Investigation has limitations in comparison to investing in stock markets, since 
academics use past data and do not include transaction and information costs; the 
profitability of stock market anomalies is sensitive to the market and the period 
analysed (Fama, 1998); professional traders cannot usually outperform the market 
on a consistent basis (Malkiel, 2003). 
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Chapter 3 provided a detailed survey of one specific investment strategy. Because of 
the close relationship between momentum, and short- and long-term overreaction 
effects, the whole winner-loser anomaly was surveyed. This study reviewed 
investigations that have rationalised the winner-loser effect by examining factors 
such as risk, size, trading volume, microstructure effects, industry, business cycle 
and behavioural finance. For example, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) report that 
an industry factor can explain the momentum profits, Lee and Swaminathan (2000) 
document that different trading volume portfolios generate different momentum 
payoffs, Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) demonstrate that the business cycles of an 
economy influence the magnitude of continuation payoffs. Nevertheless, the 
rationale behind the effect appeared to be the most intriguing issue in the literature, 
since its alternative explanations were not supported by different data sets and 
methodologies. For instance, Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), excluding Nasdaq 
stocks from Moskowitz's and Grinblatt's sample and examining an alternative 
breakdown for defining winners and losers, argue that in these circumstances, the 
industry factor cannot explain the continuation profitability. The opposite findings 
emerge using different data sets indicating a need for further empirical investigation 
into the rationale behind this anomaly. 
Since chapter 4 explained the selection of data and the methodology of calculating 
momentum profitability, Chapter 5 reported the continuation profits that are 
generated from my data. This study has found approximately the same magnitude of 
momentum profitability as other investigations that have employed UK (e. g., Liu et 
al., 1999) and international data (e. g., Rouwenhorst, 1998). Using two different 
samples, the full and the accounting sub-sample, it was demonstrated that the 
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momentum profitability is slightly higher than 1 per cent per month, but that the 
magnitude varied according to the sub-period is analysed. Momentum profitability 
was considerably higher between 1989 and 1993. In addition, this thesis reported 
that the anomaly is not restricted to the extreme winner and loser portfolios, but 
occurs in all portfolios. The raw monthly portfolio returns are 0.05,0.85,1.05,1.23 
and 1.31 per cent when we move from the past losers to winners. Momentum profits 
became even stronger when I employed compounding portfolio returns, rather than 
simple arithmetic. This finding indicates that the momentum profits cannot be 
explained by different methods of calculating abnormal returns. Further analysis 
demonstrated that the size effect, trading volume and book-to-market ratios cannot 
subsume the profitability of the momentum effect. The winner portfolio tends to 
include shares with a higher market value and trading volume and lower book-to- 
market than the loser portfolio. 
The subsequent chapters attempted to discover some factors that influence the 
momentum profitability and have not been previously tested. From the sixth to the 
eight chapter, three factors that influence the magnitude of continuation profitability 
were investigated. Chapter 6 reported that momentum profits are influenced by the 
particular trading mechanism under which shares are bought and sold. First, I 
considered the Big Bang, which occurred on 27th October 1986 and had as a result 
the introduction of the automated SEAQ system and the shift of the LSE from floor- 
based market to an automated market. I calculated the momentum profits generated 
before and after the Big Bang. Findings indicated that shares traded in an automated 
structure generate much higher continuation profits than equities operated on a 
floor-based system. These results persisted after controlling for size, book-to-market 
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and risk. Findings confirm the results of Hon and Tonks (2003) who demonstrate 
that momentum strategies could not provide profitability in a sub-period from 1955 
to 1976. But the results contradict the findings of Liu et al. (1999) who suggest 
approximately the same momentum profitability between 1977-1987 and 1988- 
1998. There is a difference between Liu et al. and this investigation, since they 
examine weekly stock returns from Datastream and this study investigates monthly 
share returns from the LSPD. 
Second, I considered the introduction of the SETS auction mechanism, which 
occurred on 20`h October 1997 and had as a result the shift of the LSE from the pure 
dealership market to the SETS system. All FTSE 100 stocks, and later some 
additional large companies from the FTSE250, have been traded on the SETS 
auction system. Results showed that shares traded on the SETS order-driven system 
tend to demonstrate larger continuation profits than shares traded on the SEAQ 
quote-driven system. The difference in momentum profits between the two 
structures increases significantly after considering size differences. Companies 
traded on SETS are the largest capitalisation shares and consistent with Hong et al. 
(2000), they would expect to demonstrate low rather than large momentum returns. 
Beyond the finding that momentum profits vary under alternative market structures, 
Chapter 6 reported other interesting results. I found that momentum profits are 
significant when we use all listed companies on the LSE (over 6000 shares), a sub- 
sample of 2000 shares with additional accounting information and a small number 
of 266 stocks with complete return information from 1975 to 2001. It further 
documented that momentum profits persist after controlling for size, book-to-market 
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and risk as defined by either the CAPM or the three-factor model. These findings 
suggest that the momentum effect persists on the LSE using various data sets and 
after controlling for various factors that influence share returns. 
Chapter 7 examined whether momentum profitability is associated with firms' rank 
period volatility. I reported that volatility has a significant impact on the size of 
momentum profits. Shares with high (low) rank period volatility tend to generate 
high (low) momentum profitability. For higher volatility equities, monthly 
continuation profits (W-L) are 0.70,0.91,1.20,1.42 and 1.47 per cent, where the 
full sample displays momentum payoffs at 1.26 per cent per month. High volatility 
shares enjoy 0.77 (t-statistic=2.1 1) per cent higher monthly continuation profits than 
their low volatility counterpart companies. Volatility further has a positive impact 
on the size of momentum profits when medium- and large- capitalisation shares are 
employed. This is not true when small- size stocks are considered. It is further 
investigated the association between volatility, trading volume and the magnitude of 
continuation profits. After controlling for trading volume (volatility), volatility 
(trading volume) tends to keep influencing the magnitude of momentum profits. 
Beyond the finding that momentum profits vary in portfolios formed on the basis of 
historical standard deviations, this study states further significant findings. 
Consistent with Liu et al. (1999) using UK data, it found that momentum strategies 
are feasible since they do provide profitability in other than only small capitalisation 
shares that exhibit liquidity problems. Constructing three size-portfolios, this study 
reports that the medium sized capitalisation portfolio displays the highest 
continuation profits (1.56 per cent per month), followed by the large (1.39 per cent 
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per month) and then, by the small size group (0.74 per cent per month). Consistent 
further with Lee and Swaminathan (2000) who employ US data, this study shows 
that there exists a positive association between trading volume and momentum 
gains. 
Chapter 8 investigated whether different market states influence the magnitude of 
momentum profitability. The motivation to investigate such an association arises 
because contradictory findings emerge in various finance fields when the full, the 
bull or the bear market periods are investigated separately (e. g., Pettengill et al., 
1995). This study classified bull and bear markets based on two definitions: 
individual share returns and market index performances. Findings show that 
continuation profits are stronger following bear markets. Shares with losses (gains) 
over the rank period generate on average 1.05 (0.24) per cent monthly momentum 
profitability; when the market returns are negative (positive) during the rank period, 
monthly momentum profits are 1.86 (1.13) per cent. 
Further analysis addressed the issue in general and analysed whether the 
profitability of momentum strategies is related to past market/share returns. I 
separated different states according to the past market and share performances and I 
run a regression to investigate whether the rank period market returns as an 
independent variable can influence significantly the momentum profits as a 
dependent variable. Overall, I found that tests supported the existence of a general 
negative association between momentum profits and market/share returns. 
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Chapter 9 further investigated whether investors can enjoy superior performances 
by combining the momentum and reversal effects. A combination portfolio was 
formed that buys past winners over the previous six months and past losers over the 
past three years. Overall, results concur partially with Balvers and Wu (2002). The 
hybrid strategy provides significant abnormal profits at 1.29 per cent per month. 
This profitability is significantly larger than that gained by the counterpart reversal 
strategy, but only a little higher than that found by the momentum strategy. The 
hybrid strategy tends to outperform significantly both counterpart methods during 
strong bull markets. 
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10.2 IMPLICATIONS 
This study reported important information for investors. Traders can generate 
superior momentum profits when they trade shares under automated than floor 
systems. Pre-Big Bang monthly momentum profits are 0.73 per cent under the floor 
system and 2.14 per cent under the automated system. Investors can achieve 
stronger momentum profits when they trade shares under an auction system, since 
monthly momentum profits for shares traded with the SETS mechanism are 2.94 per 
cent. 
Investors can achieve superior momentum returns following the momentum strategy 
on shares with high volatility. When large capitalisation shares are employed, shares 
with the highest rank period volatility generate 2.35 per cent per month momentum 
profits. A combination strategy that buys winner shares with low rank period 
volatility and sells short loser shares with high rank period volatility generate 
momentum profits at the size of 1.95 per cent per month. 
Traders can gain stronger size of abnormal returns selecting to follow the 
momentum strategy in periods when the market return over the past was poor. 
Investors can achieve monthly momentum profits of 1.55,1.72,1.86 and 2.15 
undertaking the momentum strategy after the bear state. The longer the period to 
define the bear market, the smaller the number of periods in which the market index 
was negative and the stronger the momentum profits that achieved. Besides, 
investors that undertake the momentum strategy following the bear state are subject 
to limited buying and selling-short signals and thus, transaction costs can cover only 
a small part of the documented abnormal profitability. These findings are important 
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for investors, since the momentum effect provides stronger returns in difficult-bear 
periods. 
Investors can accomplish significant abnormal profits when they combine the 
momentum with the long-term overreaction effects. A strategy that buys the shares 
with the best returns over the previous 6 months and buys the shares with the worst 
returns over the past 3 years achieves large profits at 1.29 per cent per month. This 
profitability is only slightly higher than that achieved by the conventional 
momentum strategy. Nevertheless the advantage of the hybrid strategy is that 
proposes only to buy shares, while to follow the momentum strategy one has to sell- 
short shares, a strategy that is a subject of restrictions on the size, price and types of 
stocks. 
This study further reported important information for academics. I documented 
strong findings against the weak form of stock market efficiency. When a simple 
strategy that bases on past share returns is employed, systematic profits are 
generated. The momentum strategy displays abnormal returns in around 85 per cent 
of the test periods. The momentum strategy is strong when different data are 
employed. I found that momentum profits are significant when I use all listed 
companies on the LSE (over 6000 shares), a sub-sample of 2000 shares with 
additional accounting information, the SETS sample of 150 shares and a small 
number of 266 stocks with complete return information from 1975 to 2001. Beyond 
economic significant profitability, the momentum effect also generates statistical 
significant abnormal returns. The W-L portfolio provides statistical significance at 5 
percent when parametric and non-parametric methods were employed. The 
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momentum profitability remains strong when different methods to calculate the 
abnormal profitability used. Both simple arithmetic average returns and compound 
returns report that the continuation strategy provides profitability. Momentum 
profits even remain when I control for other stock market anomalies such as the size 
and the book-to-market effects and when I control for risk defined by the CAPM 
and the three-factor model. 
The evidence presented in this thesis helps further understanding of the pattern of 
share returns over medium-term horizons. A significant portion of momentum 
profitability stems from the magnitude of volatility. When market is highly volatile, 
share prices tend to display wide out returns and therefore, high magnitude of 
momentum profitability is achieved. Momentum profits tend to be significantly 
higher in recent periods, when the market has been characterised by high volatility. 
Nevertheless when investors invest in high volatility shares, they should be awarded 
with stronger returns for the risk they accept. Until now no other study shown the 
role of volatility in influencing momentum profits and I suggest that studies should 
incorporate volatility before undertaking a further investigation. 
This study reported findings that contradict the concept of Hong and Stein (1999) 
that the momentum effect arises from the gradual expansion of information among 
investors. I reported that the SETS sample, in which share prices adjust more 
quickly to news, generate stronger continuation profits than the counterpart shares 
traded in the dealer structure. In addition, consistent to Hong and Stein model, when 
there exists a decreasing risk aversion, the result is a greater delayed overreaction 
and so, stronger momentum profits. Considering that the risk-aversion of investors 
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decreases when their wealth increases (e. g., Campbell and Cochrane, 1999), the 
Hong and Stein model predicts that momentum profits are stronger following bull 
markets. This prediction contradicts the findings reported in this study, since 
momentum profits are significantly higher following bear markets. These findings 
show how fragile is the investigation of behavioural models when empirical data are 
used. Hong et al. (2000) and Doukas and McKnight (2003) associate the speed of 
information that flows among investors with the size and the analyst coverage of 
companies' and they support the theoretical findings of the model. 
This study further documented results that contradict the model of Daniel et al. 
(1998) that the momentum effect stems from the investors' overconfidence that 
increases following the arrival of confirming news. Traders' overconfidence 
increase when the movement of the market is upward, since share prices tend to go 
higher and investors attribute the gains to their skills. Therefore, the model would 
predict that momentum profits are stronger following bull markets. This prediction 
contradicts the findings reported in this study, since momentum profits are 
significantly higher following bear markets. Again this finding shows how fragile is 
the investigation of behavioural models when empirical data are used. Daniel and 
Titman (1999) associate the overconfidence of investors with shares that are 
difficult for valuation (based on book-to-market values) and support the theoretical 
findings of the model. 
1 Information spreads slower among investors within companies with small capitalisation and with 
low analyst coverage rather than the counterpart companies with large capitalisation and with high 
analyst coverage. 
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10.3 LIMITATIONS 
This study is subject to limitations. Small investors would have difficulties to follow 
the momentum strategy. We defined winner and loser portfolios employing 30,20 
and 10 per cent of the sample. This implies that an investor should buy and sell- 
short some hundreds of stocks to employ the strategy. Small investors are not in the 
financial position to undertake those strategies. I propose that small traders can 
follow the strategy using limited number of winners and losers, expected high 
variability of their returns. 
I assumed that investors can sell short shares without any limitation. There are 
restrictions on the size, price and types of stocks investors can sell short. For 
example, traders cannot sell penny stocks and cannot sell short in a declining 
market, there are even markets that short-selling is against the law, some investors 
consider short-selling an immoral trading method against the benefit of their 
country. The momentum strategy proposes to buy past winners to take advantage of 
bull markets and to sell short prior losers to protect your gains during bear markets. 
Since stock markets in the long-term tend to move upward, buying only the winner 
portfolio can generate significant profits in the long-term. 
This study further used past data to investigate the profitability of the momentum 
strategy. A strategy that provides profits using past data does not imply that can 
offer abnormal profits in the future. For example, widely known stock market 
anomalies such as the size and weekend effects gradually tend to lose their ability to 
generate profitability (e. g., Dimson et al., 2001). I predict that one or two decades 
later, the momentum strategy will not be able to beat the market. Investors will 
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attempt to employ the strategy and gradually its ability to generate profitability will 
disappear. 
Finally, this study employed simple t-statistics and equivalent non-parametric tests 
(Mann-Whitney U and Kruskal-Wallis tests) to investigate the statistical 
significance of momentum returns. Nevertheless this study did not use a bootstrap 
analysis to examine the statistical significance. Liu et al. (1999) use bootstrapped t- 
statistics and find that p-values become significantly higher. 
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10.4 POTENTIAL FUTURE INVESTIGATION 
This study poses interesting questions that require further examination. First, this 
thesis investigated some of original factors that influence the magnitude of 
momentum profitability: stock market structures, volatility and bull and bear 
markets. The query that emerges is whether these factors can still be shown to 
influence continuation profits when using different data sets. For instance, further 
analysis could investigate the momentum profitability generated when the same 
shares are traded on the LSE dealer market and the Paris Bourse auction market. In 
addition, potential work could examine whether shares with different past volatility 
demonstrate significantly different momentum payoffs using European, Asian and 
US data. 
Potential future analysis could examine the significance of the factors that have 
been investigated in this study concerning the short- and long-term overreaction 
profitability. Chapter 3 documented that momentum, and short- and long-term 
overreaction effects are similar; like the two faces of the same coin. Further work 
could examine the magnitude of long- and short-term overreaction profitability in 
bull and bear markets, under alternative stock market structures, and in shares with 
different volatility. 
Analysis could also examine additional factors that influence momentum profits, 
e. g., calculation of continuation profits using opening and closing prices. Since 
opening and closing prices demonstrate different volatility, they would be expected 
to generate different momentum profitability. In addition, transaction costs could be 
considered: this thesis assumes that momentum profits are high enough to cover any 
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transaction costs, but further analysis could investigate whether transaction costs 
have been underestimated in the relevant UK literature. Finally, evidence for 
seasonality in momentum profits could be sought, since there has to date been no 
examination of continuation payoffs using UK data in different months of the year. 
Future investigation thus could provide further evidence that will aid understanding 
of the return patterns over short-, medium- and long-term periods. 
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